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Abstract: 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics has been ascribed a conservative position in 
relation to textual interpretation. I wish to explore what effect radical texts (texts which challenge 
Gadamer’s definitions of  textuality) have upon philosophical hermeneutics. I chose to work with 
Watt by Samuel Beckett and Naked Lunch by William S. Burroughs because both texts challenge 
assumptions surrounding meaning and understanding, two key facets of  philosophical 
hermeneutics. Both novels illustrate the effect of  fragmented historical horizons upon the 
interpretative process. This observation is accessible through Gadamer’s descriptive theory and 
allows the interpretation of  both Watt and Naked Lunch to engage with the meta-hermeneutic 
concerns in both avant-garde texts. The close-reading of  both novels will illustrate how they 
challenge Gadamer’s notion of  play between horizons, and I will show this to be productive for both 
interpretative understanding as well as responding to Gadamer’s critics. It is my contention that 
Gadamer’s theoretical description offers a unique way to read Watt and Naked Lunch but crucially, 
philosophical hermeneutics is indelibly changed by an interaction with these two novels.  
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Introduction 
Hermeneutics can be defined as the study of  interpretation and understanding. The word is etymo-
logically linked to the Greek god Hermes who, in Homer’s The Iliad and The Odyssey served as a mes-
senger both amongst the gods—ferrying messages between Zeus and the rest of  the pantheon—and 
between the gods and  humans (Palmer 2). As a distinct scholarly discipline, hermeneutics has its 
origins in nineteenth-century theology which sought to formulate a unified theory of  interpretation 
(Warnke 1). Biblical scholarship, particularly during the Reformation, relied on hermeneutics as a 
tool to respond to enquiries revolving around the “correct” interpretation of  holy texts. But it was in 
the nineteenth-century that hermeneutics shifted gears, and became focused around ideas of  “ob-
jectivity” and complete-ness. The question of  hermeneutics moved from ways of  understanding and 
interpreting texts towards the construction of  methodologies involved in comprehending any utter-
ances at all. F.D.E Schleiermacher pioneered this field by suggesting that the gap created by time 
forced hermeneutics to acknowledge that it always began from a position of  misunderstanding. As 
such, hermeneutics needed to account for this temporal gulf  and strive after an objective histori-
cism. Schleiermacher’s student, Wilhelm Dilthey, began the process of  interrogating the different 
methodologies of  the Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences) and the Naturwissenschaften (natural sci-
ences). In Dilthey’s formulation the knowledges of  each methodological impulse were drastically 
different and he sought to build a methodology that would offer the humanities the same “objec-
tive” knowledge science laid claim to (Warnke 2). This early theoretical exploration of  the method-
ology of  hermeneutics was found to be wholly unsatisfactory by Hans-Georg Gadamer.  
Hans-Georg Gadamer published his magnum opus Truth and Method in 1960. In this tome Gadamer 
outlined his description of  interpretation. Building on  Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, Gadamer 
saw interpretation as the quintessential philosophical act. Gadamer was Heidegger’s student in  the 
1920s, during the time that Heidegger was working on Being and Time (1927). Heidegger’s early 
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thought influences much of  Truth and Method but, as Heidegger remarked: “‘Hermeneutic philoso-
phy’, that is Gadamer’s business” (Heidegger 395). The “hermeneutic philosophy” that Gadamer 
espoused in his 1960 publication sought to present a unified description of  “what always occurs in 
understanding” (Gadamer 235). The description of  understanding as a universal enterprise broad-
ened the scope of  hermeneutics. For Gadamer the “method” of  hermeneutics was not as important 
as the hubristic “truth” that interpretation and understanding were anti-teleological concepts. This 
meant that the interpretative action of  hermeneutics was always-already in process and that the 
claims to “objectivity” and complete understanding were wholly false. For Gadamer the focus of  
hermeneutics became an investigation into the second order processes of  understanding, rather than 
methodological guidelines.  
Despite Gadamer’s radical re-conception of  hermeneutics as a process without telos, philosophical 
hermeneutics was derided for its failure to acknowledge the embedded ideologies at play during the 
interpretative process. Jürgen Habermas claimed that Gadamer’s description of  understanding pre-
sented Tradition as hypostatised. For Habermas this designation of  an all pervasive, monolithic 
Tradition obscures the power relationships embedded in understanding (Donghyun 104).  In 
Habermas’s reading of  philosophical hermeneutics, the unquestionable universality of  Tradition 
necessarily imposes a series of  “systematic distortions” embedded in the reader’s attempts to under-
stand. Habermas locates his definition of  Tradition in a potentially false dichotomy he establishes 
between Reason and authority. It is from this polarising dichotomy that Habermas found Gadamer’s 
description of  understanding incapable of  accounting for the interpellation of  the reader and the 
text within their respective historical situations. As such both historically effected parties could not 
engage in any meaningful dialogue. In Habermas’s view “objective criticism” of  certain Traditions 
is not a possibility for philosophical hermeneutics.  
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This dissertation seeks to address this criticism and explore its veracity in relation to two avant-
garde, proto-Post-Modern novels published during the 1950s. By working closely with Samuel Beck-
ett’s Watt and William S. Burroughs’s Naked Lunch I will illustrate how the novels’s preoccupation 
with interpretation and engagement with a reader present challenges to philosophical hermeneu-
tics’s description of  understanding. These challenges I will argue, allow the meta-hermeneutic as-
pects of  both texts to assume a central role in the interpretative discussion. I argue that  these texts 
are about interpretation. The meaning of  Watt and Naked Lunch is found in the ways this meta-
hermeneutic content influences the reader’s interpretative praxis. It is in the relation of  the texts to 
themselves that a potential response to Jürgen Habermas’s ideological critique of  philosophical 
hermeneutics can be formulated. 
	 	 i.   
Samuel Beckett’s Watt was published in 1953. The bulk of  the text had been composed while Beck-
ett was on the run from the Gestapo between 1943-1945 (Ackerley viii). The text was only published 
in 1953, by a subdivision of  Olympia Press (Campbell 61). The type-script was sent to different pub-
lishing houses and some early reader’s reports found the text “too wild and unintelligible” to be pub-
lished—especially given the postwar limitations on the supply of  paper (Ackerley xi). The novel is 
divided into five parts including an Addenda which “Only fatigue and disgust prevented” from be-
ing incorporated into the main body of  the text (Beckett 215). The parts are not sequentially lin-
ear—“As Watt told the beginning of  the story, not first, but second, so not fourth, but third” (Beckett 
186). Part three is largely centred around the relationship between Watt and the fictional narrator 
Sam; offering the reader a bizarre representation of  the construction of  the novel itself. Part two 
takes place in Knott’s establishment and captures Watt’s ever increasing befuddlement with the quo-
tidian events whilst he is in Knott’s employment. Parts one and four are centred around a train sta-
tion—a central symbol for Beckett’s preoccupation with “waiting”. But none of  the above crude 
summary is what the novel is about. Instead, as I will argue, the novel is about interpretation and un-
derstanding. 
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Watt was the last long novel Beckett wrote in English. After Watt Beckett turned to composing in 
French. Much has been made of  this turn away from English in the critical literature that surrounds 
Watt.  Most often the criticism focuses on the strange, unsettled language of  Watt as a textual em1 -
bodiment of  Beckett’s growing dissatisfaction with English. I believe this argument to be dangerous-
ly anachronistic. By ignoring Watt’s compilation dates, the argument seeks to explain away the “es-
tranged kind of  English” of  Watt by reading it through the French novels which followed during the 
1950s (Byron 497). This ultimately unsettles the contextually derived argument that this position re-
lies on to explicate the multiple narrative disruptions of  Watt. These responses rely on Beckett’s con-
text to explain Watt’s estranged language (a novel capturing the interstitial position of  Beckett as out-
law during a time of  chaos). However, by reading the French novels into Watt these arguments un-
dercut their initial reliance on contextual location.  
Beckett described the novel as an “unsatisfactory book” to George Reavey in 1947 while he sought a 
publisher for Watt. Beckett found the text to be “unsatisfactory” because it was written in “dribs and 
drabs” (Ackerley vii). The text could also be thought of  as “unsatisfactory” in that it offers no inter-
pretative resolution for the enigmatic eponymous character and his subject matter Mr Knott. Chris 
Ackerley has this to say about Watt: 
The text assumes a fundamental condition of  human fallibility and error, and it therefore in-
cludes intentional mistakes, with which to probe the soft centres of  the rationalist enterprise. 
Further, it embodies Beckett’s aesthetic of  failure: Watt’s endeavour to bear witness, to com-
prehend the essence of  his master, Mr Knott, by means of  his accidentals (a parody of  both 
Scholasticism and the Cartesian méthode), leads not to a knowing but to a philosophical im-
passe, a consequent breakdown and finally to madness. (vii)  
See Garin Dowd “Watt’s Ways: Addenda, Borders and Courses”. Samuel Beckett Today, Vol. 19 Borderless Beckett: Tokyo 2006 1
(2008). Pp, 75-85 and Onno Kosters’s “Watt as Beckett’s Parting With Joyce”. Samuel 	 Beckett Today, Vol. 21. Where 
Never Before: Beckett’s Poetics of  Elsewhere (2009). Pp, 193-207. Daniel Katz alludes to this argument briefly by suggesting 
that the stilted English and unconventional grammar serve to reinforce this position in Saying I No More: Subjectivity and 
Consciousness in the Prose of  Samuel Beckett. [Northwestern University Press: Illinois, 1999]. 
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Ackerley’s description of  the novel as embodying “Beckett’s aesthetic of  failure” is a popular critical 
rendering of  Watt.  These readings of  Watt revolve around the “unsatisfactory” nature of  the inter2 -
pretative resolution offered by the novel. These readings consider the criticisms of  Western rational 
thought as well as criticisms of  methodological approaches to understanding. Considering the 
“twelve possibilities” of  Mr Knott’s dinner arrangements that are worked through methodically by 
Watt, the absurd representation of  methodological thought (Cartesian méthode) certainly lends itself  
to these “failurist” interpretations. Beckett’s aesthetics of  failure is possibly best encapsulated by a 
statement he made to George Duthuit in a series of  interviews about art called Three Dialogues. 
Duthuit and Beckett discuss the “plane of  the feasible”, with Duthuit asking Beckett if  this “plane” 
is so unsatisfactorily incomplete, what other “plane can there be for the maker?”: 
B. —Logically, none. Yet I speak of  an art turning away from it in disgust, weary of  puny 
exploits, weary of  pretending to being able, of  being able, of  doing a little better the same 
old thing, of  going a little further along a dreary road. 
D. —And preferring what?  
B. —The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing 
from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation 
to express. (Duthuit 103) 
The preference Beckett describes regarding art is the closest approximation of  his aesthetics of  fail-
ure I can comfortably represent, before its representation becomes a self-effacing paradox. In Watt 
the failure to understand has most often been attributed to the titular character, who, in an ironic act 
of  nominative determinism, never uncovers “what” Knott is. However, as I will argue the “failure” 
lies with the fictional representation of  interpretation as capable of  understanding completely. Watt 
seems to anticipate Gadamer’s hubristic anti-teleological philosophical hermeneutics in that “under-
standing” completely is a misguided and impossible task. Instead, the text presents a series of  inter-
pretations offered by Watt’s interlocutors and the fictional narrator , Sam, as examples of  this failed 
faith in complete understanding. This is most overtly captured in Sam’s relationship with Watt. Sam 
See Richard Coe Beckett (1964), John Fletcher The Novels of  Samuel Beckett (1964), Raymond Federman Journey To Chaos: 2
Samuel Beckett’s Early Fiction (1965), Jacqueline Hoefer Watt in Samuel Beckett: A Collection of  Critical Essays edited by Martin 
Esslin (1965), Lawrence Harvey Samuel Beckett: Poet and Critic (1970), David Hesla The Shape of  Chaos: An Interpretation of  the 
Art of  Samuel Beckett (1970), Ruby Cohn Back to Beckett (1973), J.E. Dearlove Accommodating the Chaos: Samuel Beckett’s Nonrela-
tional Art (1983), Michael Mooney “Watt: Samuel Beckett's Sceptical Fiction,” in Rethinking Beckett: A Collection of  Critical 
Essays, edited by Lance St. John Butler and Robin Davis (1990), John Pilling “Beckett's English Fiction,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Beckett, edited by John Pilling, 17-42 (1993) 
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casts Watt as object for interpretation, denying him a historicality. For Gadamer’s system this tran-
scendent location means that Watt is incapable of  understanding. Sam’s failure to allow Watt to un-
derstand, to “hear the questions” Watt asks of  him, is a faulty hermeneutic practice that leads to 
Watt’s failed interpretations (Gadamer 280). The focus for my engagement with Watt lies not in the 
ways Watt fails to understand Knott, but in the ways Sam fails to understand Watt.  
Sam fails to understand the character of  his narrative and, as such the text is a representation of  
Sam’s failed interpretative gestures rather than Watt’s. In this vein the text becomes self-interpreting; 
the multi-layered narrative captures Sam’s engagement with Watt, Watt’s engagement with the 
world of  Sam’s narrative, and these hermeneutic gestures influence the reader’s interpretation. The 
text, in Marc Byron’s formulation is “ecstatic” because it is never “simply there” offering itself  up as 
a willing, and available, interpretative partner for the reader to engage with (495). Jonathan Stuart 
Boulter describes this process as a hermeneutics of  relation because Watt can never speak of  the 
“object” itself  because he is the “object”, and to talk of  himself  as an “object” would be to deny his 
own subjectivity thus denying him the possibility of  thinking about himself  (152). 
I will suggest that it is this tension between interpreter and interpretable object that creates the ec-
static self-relation of  Watt to itself. I will use philosophical hermeneutics to discuss the dramatised 
aspects of  interpretation that Watt represents. This will allow me to interrogate the relation of  the 
reader to the text. If  Watt is a self-interpreting novel, what is the role of  the reader and what does 
this self-interpretation do to the reader’s hermeneutic praxis as defined by philosophical hermeneu-
tics? These will be my guiding questions in this chapter on Watt.  
	 	 ii. 
In 1959 William Seward Burroughs published Naked Lunch with French “purveyors of  
pornography”, Olympia Press (Ackerley x). Maurice Girodias, Olympia Press’s owner, specialised in 
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the distribution of  “dirty books (d.bs)” with green covers to returning soldiers who passed through 
Paris in the 1950s (Campbell 70). Naked Lunch was a collection of  notes that Burroughs had been col-
lating  and writing for the entire decade. The bulk of  these notes emerged during his time in Tang-
iers. When Girodias first saw the rat eaten, mouldy manuscript of  Naked Lunch in 1958, he found it 
too distasteful for publication. However an excerpt from the text appeared in a literary journal 
called Big Table in America and caused such uproar with the contemporary literary world that Giro-
dias decided to capitalise on the publicity by publishing the book in 1959 (Morgan 332). Despite this 
early publication, the text was only published in the US and the UK in 1964, after a landmark cen-
sorship trial which “in effect marked the end of  literary censorship in the United States” (Morgan 
370). Burroughs was very concerned with what he termed “control”; a blanket term encapsulating a 
diverse and far reaching range of  limitations placed on individuals: from bureaucratic agencies (in-
cluding censorship boards), to narcotics law enforcement, the temporal structuring of  time in the 
form of  the clock and, most importantly, language as a form of  thought control. Naked Lunch cap-
tures this anxiety with control, especially in the form of  language and understanding.  
Burroughs elaborated his theory of  language fairly often in interviews and published a “manifesto” 
of  sorts in The Electronic Revolution. He believed language to be part of  the “Word Virus” which 
forced humanity into a representational impasse. Burroughs believed that words were only effective 
if  they could capture the instantaneity of  representation afforded by a picture: in which our desire 
to constantly capture life in words alienated us from life. In Naked Lunch Burroughs claims to be of-
fering a “blue-print, a How-To Book…To extend levels of  experience by opening the door at the 
end of  a long hall way…Doors that open in Silence…Naked Lunch demands Silence from the Read-
er…Otherwise he is taking his own pulse.” (187). This didactic claim of  the text seems to create an 
impasse for Burroughs: if  words are the enemy of  freedom, how can this novel teach the “Reader” 
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“How-To” get “there”?  Burroughs’s text seems to establish itself  as an authority on the dangers of  3
authority. For the reader who wishes to take Burroughs seriously and treat his text as Gadamer 
would have it—in possession of  whole, unified and coherent meanings (Linge xx)—the challenge is 
to remain aware of  this impasse created by Burroughs’s reliance and absolute distrust of  language as 
a medium of  expression. I will argue that there is a potentially productive anxiety effected through 
the acknowledgement of  this impasse. It becomes apparent that Naked Lunch is not only a “blue-
print” but also an affecting model; influencing the reader through language and establishing him/
her as a “mark” to be “conned” by the “Word Virus”.  
The novel itself  has been subjected to multiple readings since its publication in 1959. Critical re-
sponses have ranged form the morally outraged to the theoretically intrigued. Naked Lunch occupies a 
unique space in Burroughs’s oeuvre, as it represents a turn away from the naive reportage style of  
his two earlier works Junkie and Queer.  Initial reviews of  Naked Lunch saw it as a morally abhorrent, 4
destructive novel—one famous review titled “Ugh…” contributed largely to this sentiment. Later 
scholarship however, began to see in Burroughs’s experimental form a ready ally for the emerging 
post-structuralist schools of  literary engagement.  The other mode of  critical response generated by 5
Naked Lunch took the form of  literary biography, intertwined with  ad hominem historicism. Much of  
this criticism is waylaid by the public persona that William S. Burroughs became as a figure of  the 
 Just to be absolutely clear: I am not interested in where “there” is. I am interested in the effect this claim has on 3
hermeneutic practice for the reader. 
 Queer was written in 1947 but would only be published in 1987. The text remains incomplete, as Burroughs turned his 4
back on the burgeoning novel, choosing instead to focus on the emerging collection of  notes which would become Naked 
Lunch.
 See Mary McCarthy “Burroughs’s Naked Lunch” (1963), Tony Tanner “Rub out the Word” (1971), Antony Hilfer 5
“Mariner and Wedding Guest in William S. Burroughs’s Naked Lunch” (1980), Robin Lydenberg Word Cultures: Radical 
theory and Practice in William S. Burroughs’s Fiction (1987), Wayne Pounds “The Postmodern Anus: Parody and Utopia in 
Two Recent Novels by William S. Burroughs.” (1987), David Ingram “William Burroughs and Language” (1996), Timo-
thy Murphy Wising up the Marks: The Amodern William Burroughs  (1997), Ron Loewinsohn “‘Gentle Reader, I fain would 
spare you this, but my pen hath its will like the Ancient Mariner’: Narrator(s) and Audience in William S. Burroughs’s 
Naked Lunch” (1998) Kathryn Hume “William S. Burroughs’s Phantasmic Geography” (1999), Pollina Mackay “The 
Naked Apocalypse of  William S. Burroughs’s Naked Lunch (2003). Christopher Land “Apomorphine Silence: Cutting-Up 
Burroughs’s Theory of  Language and Control” (2005).
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“underground”.  This criticism is incredibly valuable but I find aspects of  this literary biographical 6
response contentious. Firstly, much of  this work centres around responding to the incorrect percep-
tion that Burroughs exists on the margins of  the academy. Judging by the wealth of  critical respons-
es generated by his fiction, his polemical theorising, and his experimentation in multi-modal art, 
Burroughs is firmly entrenched within the oeuvre of  American Literature (much to his own dis-
gruntlement I’m sure). Secondly, the vast majority of  this criticism seeks to understand Burroughs’s 
experiments in fiction as a consequence of  his biographical details—drug addiction, experimenting 
with his personal perspective through various pseudo-scientific spiritual adaptations. Yet these arti-
cles very often stress the inherent random-ness of  Burroughs’s texts. This is a contradiction: Bur-
roughs cannot be consciously seeking the means to creating random disorder. This is something I 
address directly in my chapter on Naked Lunch.  
Naked Lunch is best described as a mosaic novel: fragmented in form, it unites a series of  characters 
rather than a central plot or story arc by placing them in the same horrific phantasmagoria. Ted 
Morgan describes the novel as such: “In form, Naked Lunch was startling, bearing as much resem-
blance to the conventional novel as a videotape to the Bayeux Tapestry, or a strobe light to a candle” 
(372). The text is comprised of  what Burroughs’s termed “routines”:  “Short, phantasmagorical 
prose pieces, usually involving mutations of  people and events. . .”(Campbell 259). These routines 
create a patchwork of  a paranoid world, filled with vying factions, double-agents, mind control, cor-
rupt politicians and experimental doctors. The text is obsessed with representing manipulation and 
connivance. Burroughs expressly desires to move away from an allegorical understanding of  lan-
guage, desiring something more direct. Yet, in a move that can (and has) been likened to what 
 Jennie Skerl William S. Burroughs (1985), Barry Miles William Burroughs: El Hombre Invisible (1992) and William S. Bur6 -
roughs: A Life (2014), Oliver Harris “Can You See A Virus? The Queer Cold War of  William Burroughs” (1999), “Cold 
War Correspondents: Ginsberg, Kerouac, Cassady and the Political Economy of  Beat Letters” (2000), “Beating the 
Academy” (2000) and William Burroughs and the Secret of  Fascination (2003), Allen Johnson “Consumption, Addiction, Vi-
sion, Energy: Political Economies and Utopian Visions in the Writings of  the Beat Generation” (2005),  Alex Werener-
Colan “Implicating the Confessor: The Autobiographical Ploy in William S. Burroughs’s Early Fiction (2010), Fiona 
Paton “Monstrous Rhetoric: Naked Lunch, National Security and the Gothic Fifties” (2010), Ted Morgan Literary Outlaw: 
The Life and Times of  William S. Burroughs (2012).
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Wittgenstein described as “throwing away the ladder”, he uses language to create suspicion around 
meaning.  I wish to explore the effect of  this suspicion on philosophical hermeneutics by proffering 7
a reading of  Naked Lunch via Gadamer’s descriptive theory of  understanding. In so doing I will show 
the productive sense of  anxiety that Naked Lunch encourages and suggests a response to the potential 
impasse created by Burroughs’s authoritative language. 
	 	 iii. 
Neither Watt nor Naked Lunch are simple, linear texts. Neither novel could be considered to be whole, 
unified, nor coherent in their form. However, I will argue that while this might not be true for the 
whole of  both texts, they do contain Gadamer’s notion of  coherency, unity and wholeness in mean-
ing in their parts. These parts in turn present fractured and multiple horizons of  meaning. These 
horizons are central to Gadamer’s description of  understanding and, the representation of  their 
fragmentation in these two novels, I will argue, allows for the dissolution of  the monolithic notion of  
Tradition Habermas employs when critiquing philosophical hermeneutics. I will show how the nov-
els seem to pre-empt some of  Gadamer’s claims about meaning through a dramatisation of  an often 
frustrated interpretative dialogue. This is not to say that Watt and Naked Lunch are solely philosophi-
cal hermeneutic novels. Instead I wish to show how the representation of  meaning both texts are 
interested in anticipates much of  what Gadamer will suggest “always occurs” in understanding 
(Gadamer 235). Watt and Naked Lunch share a historical epoch with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and 
Method, and Gadamer’s failure to engage with these contemporary texts for his theoretical descrip-
tion alludes to the belatedness of  theoretical description. Both novels betray an awareness of  a read-
er which is manifest in the textual manipulation that the texts bring to bear on the reader’s attempt 
to understand through interpretative dialogue. Burroughs’s and Beckett’s novels similarly encourage 
 Peterson, R.G.“A Picture is a Fact: Wittgenstein and The Naked Lunch.” Twentieth Century Literature, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jul., 7
1966) connects Burroughs’s text to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in which Wittgenstein creates a philosophi-
cal system designed to equip language with the tools to talk about language (amongst many other topics). 
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the reader to confront the impossibility of  presenting a unified, coherent understanding of  what 
they may mean, yet simultaneously require the reader to bear these conceptions of  unified coheren-
cy in mind when confronting the radical doubt of  interpretation. 
It is in this challenge to unified coherent meaning that this dissertation wishes to propose an inter-
vention. Both Burroughs’s and Beckett’s fascicular texts about and around their novels, suggest a 
conception of  representation that is similar in cadence to John Keats’s negative capability, “I mean 
Negative Capability, that is when a man is capable of  being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without 
any irritable reaching after fact and reason” (1817, 40-41). For Keats this negative capability was a 
hallmark of  a “great man in literature”. Yet it has strong connections and disruptions for the 
hermeneutic enterprise described by Gadamer. In Keats’s usage “negative capability” does not do 
much critical work. However, in these two novels the unyielding doubt, and insecurity created dur-
ing the interpretative process, take on a far more radical hue than Keats’s original description of  
negative capability. Both novels seek to show the impossibility and the dangers of  having “complete” 
understanding. This is manifested in their mutual dissatisfaction with the medium they worked in: 
the word. 
The seemingly shared dissatisfaction of  Burroughs and Beckett with the word as a medium of  ex-
pression takes on different guises in both author’s works. In Burroughs’s case this manifests itself  
much more stridently than in Beckett’s novel. But this unyielding conception of  language as unsatis-
fying is carried through to the reader during the interpretative dialogue which takes place when 
reading Watt and Naked Lunch. This creates a lot of  the radical doubt that the reader is confronted 
with in both texts and establishes the meta-hermeneutic concerns of  Watt and Naked Lunch. Both 
novels are self-consciously aware of  the reader and employ this awareness in different ways. For 
Beckett the reader is relegated to a spectatorial position, witnessing the interpretative failures of  
Watt and by extension Sam. These failures to understand become parodic representations of  the 
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interpretative manoeuvres the reader tries to make in relation to the text. For the Gadamerian read-
er the horizonal interplay between Watt in Sam’s narrative, Watt telling Sam the story of  his time at 
Knott’s house, and Sam’s narrative intrusions, work to create a multiplicity of  horizons which com-
plicate both the notion of  unified coherency in meaning and the interpellation of  reader and text 
within a certain ideological framework. Naked Lunch extends this horizonal interplay through the 
patchwork form of  the novel itself. The text encourages the reader to keep in mind the interstitial 
spaces between the routines as well as the routines themselves. The text draws the reader in, at times 
creating an ally out of  the intimacy in the narrative and in other instances, reminding the reader of  
the authority the text carries. This shared concern with the authority vested in a narrative voice (or 
voices in Burroughs’s case) and the coincidental publication history of  both novels, encouraged me 
to explore these novels in relation to one another. Both texts also represent a paradigm shift in both 
author’s oeuvres. Watt bears many more of  the Beckettian hallmarks that would become predomi-
nant tropes in his trilogy and famously in Waiting for Godot. The failed or constantly halted quest of  
Watt as he seeks to understand a world beyond the pages in which he is inscribed recur in Beckett’s 
trilogy in the forms of  Molloy and especially Malone. The mock Realism and linearity of  Murphy, 
Beckett’s first English novel, have been replaced with a philosophical franticness which in his later 
works would take on the guise of  the absurd. Burroughs’s first novel Junkie is a reportage, linear nar-
rative exploring Bill Lee’s descent into the world of  the heroin addict. Many of  the scenes in Junkie 
are appropriated for Naked Lunch, but transform to meet the requirements of  the violently disruptive 
and hyperbolic mosaic novel. Naked Lunch marks a shift in Burroughs’s writing as he began to exper-
iment with more radical forms of  narrative after its publication. His cut-up trilogy, although more 
chaotic than Naked Lunch, bears the tonal intrusion of  his1959 watershed novel. Both authors moved 
away from a linearity in narrative in order to pursue a radical representation of  the interpretative 
relationship established between text and reader. Both novels are somewhat pessimistic in their rela-
tionship to meaning as a form of  control (for Burroughs) and as an impossible ideal, which one is 
“obligated” to pursue (for Beckett). By challenging the authority of  the word, and meaning as a to-
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talising term, the novels establish a space for the contemporary reader to experience the effect of  the 
interpretative dialogue. 
In both texts there is a desire to find  meaning in the anti-teleological hermeneutic dialogue. There 
is a negative capability which the reader must balance in relation to his/her desire to understand. It 
is in this sense that I argue the texts are “flush with meaning”. Through their engagement with the 
reader, this negative capability is manifested in the interpretative dialogue. It becomes a key aspect 
of  the interpretation of  both Watt and Naked Lunch. If  the reader remains aware of  this process then 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics becomes a valuable description for the process of  understanding. By re-
maining cognisant and hubristic in interpretation, the reader potentially avoids the embedded ide-
ologies of  his/her historical situation. This is directly in line with Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. I will discuss his theory and the criticisms thereof  in full in the first chapter of  this 
dissertation before moving on to grapple with Watt and Naked Lunch. This chapter will in many ways 
equip the dissertation with the critical vocabulary necessary for a meta-hermeneutic discussion of  
this ilk.  
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Chapter 1 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Problem of  
Critique. 
“It is important to note that all interpretation points in a direction rather than to some final end-
point, in the sense that it points toward an open realm…” (Gadamer 68) 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s opus Truth and Method was published in 1960 and presents his theory of  
philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer’s analysis of  hermeneutic activity takes on the moniker 
“philosophical” because he aimed to describe the conditions under which “understanding in gener-
al” takes place (Warnke 3). Gadamer explicitly states in the foreword to the second edition of  Truth 
and Method that his theory is not a prescriptive “system of  rules” designed to “direct the methodolog-
ical procedures of  the human sciences” (xxv) but stands as a description of  “what always occurs” in 
understanding (Gadamer 235). Philosophical hermeneutics is an attempt to describe, rather than 
explain, the phenomenon of  understanding universally and responds to false claims of  objectivity, 
and the potential nihilistic relativism of  subjectivity in interpretation (Linge xi). Gadamer’s main 
contribution to the field of  hermeneutics is a rehabilitation of  prejudgement. In Truth and Method he 
explores the failings of  nineteenth century hermeneutics’s attempts to overcome historical locations 
and avoid the interpellated prejudgements of  contemporary engagement. I wish to show that the 
influence of  the text on the reader’s experience of  the work of  art finds expression in Gadamer’s 
descriptive theory. Through the interaction of  historically produced and producing prejudgements, 
the affect of  the text on the reader’s interpretative manoeuvres can be described. For Watt and Naked 
Lunch this pronounceability is crucial when trying to understand the novels. As such, Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics offers a unique way to think through the interpretative problems pre-
sented by both texts.  
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Truth and Method argues that there is no truth in methodological approaches because the appeals to 
“objective” standpoints are fraught with an unacknowledged debt to the historical location from and 
within which they emerge (Linge xi). This unacknowledged historicality hampers interpretation be-
cause the potential for the text  to challenge the interpreter’s understanding of  the novel becomes 8
subsumed and ultimately lost under the rubric of  the methodology itself. Gadamer calls this chal-
lenge a claim made by the text on the interpreter. It is the interpreter’s responsibility to hear this 
claim because it is through this claim made by the text on the interpreter that the influence of  the 
prejudgements imbedded in the texts themselves become pronounceable in the interpretative ex-
change. For Gadamer this is the site in which meaning and understanding manifest themselves. It is 
only during the interaction of  the text’s prejudgements with the reader’s historical locale that mean-
ing and understanding become part of  the dialogic exchange. It is in this interaction that the effect 
of  the text upon the reader’s historical locale becomes pronounceable. For Beckett’s and Burroughs’s 
texts this effect is crucial because it is the claim made on the reader during the interpretative act. 
However before I get to the relation between the texts and philosophical hermeneutics an exegesis 
of  Gadamer’s theoretical framework is necessary. 
1.1 
Truth and Method critiques the hermeneutic frameworks of  Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Schleier-
macher while developing Martin Heidegger’s theory of  understanding as a key component of  Be-
ing. Gadamer does this in order to describe an ontological hermeneutics rather than an epistemo-
logical hermeneutics. Philosophical hermeneutics was largely responding to hermeneutic practices 
that relied on a methodologically rigorous process to deny the influence of  either the interpreter’s or 
the text’s historicality. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is ontological because its “basic con-
cern was not to defend a particular methodology of  social science but to describe ‘what always oc-
Gadamer does not limit his theory to the interpretation of  literary texts but for the purposes of  this dissertation I will 8
be talking strictly about philosophical hermeneutics’s involvement with literary texts.
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curs’ (Gadamer 235) in understanding.” (Mendelson 53) Gadamer contends that no adequate de-
scription of  understanding for the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) has been proffered by 
hermeneuticians and he argues that this is a consequence of  the Enlightenment’s devotion to ratio-
nal thought, the isolated subject, and the subsequent valorisation of  scientific methodologies. Philo-
sophical hermeneutics intends to reassert the finitude of  rationality while venerating the anti-teleo-
logical interaction of  texts with interpreters.  
Hermeneutics can be divided into two main schools of  thought: the subjectivist position and the ob-
jectivist position. The latter suggests that there is one correct meaning for the text and it is the read-
er’s job to uncover what this meaning is. The subjectivist position situates itself  in direct contrast to 
the objectivist, arguing that there are as many interpretations for a textual document as there are 
readers (Maclean 123). These two broad descriptions of  the field of  hermeneutics are important to 
bear in mind because of  the oppositional nature of  both positions. The objectivist space denies any 
subjectivity on the part of  the reader and replaces interpretation on an individual scale with a devo-
tion to methodological praxis intended to eradicate the reader’s biases. Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics suggests that all this process can ostensibly achieve is an interpretation of  the method-
ology itself, rather than an understanding of  the so-called “object of  study”.  
The subjectivist position elevates the subject to a transcendental, or ahistorical, space in which his/
her interpretation is valid purely because it has been initiated. The overriding concern with this po-
sition is that the text loses any claims to meaning it may have. However a more relevant problem—
in this dissertation at least—for the subjectivist is that this position does not engage with the text’s 
active role in influencing and, potentially, complicating the reader’s interpretative assumptions. 
Gadamer’s descriptive hermeneutics seeks to ally these two spaces of  theoretical thought. It is his 
intention to cultivate the tension created between a contemporaneous reader and a text from a sepa-
rate historical position by acknowledging the potential for these different temporal locations to elicit 
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an effect from both text and reader. A contemporary reader experiences the claims made by the text 
as an effect of  the work on their historical locale. 
These hermeneutic positions can be traced back to Cartesian philosophy. Descartes’s methodology 
of  doubt positions the subject as the foundational belief  upon which all other knowledge is based. 
Responding to the seventeenth century’s dominant philosophical trend of  scepticism, Descartes at-
tempted to find knowledge that was beyond doubt. Descartes wished to show a distinction between 
beliefs about the world and the existence of  the world. This distinction would allow him to separate 
indubitable, foundational beliefs from the superstructural knowledge inferred from those founda-
tional beliefs. The only belief  that met the foundational condition Descartes  found  was the first 
part of  the now famous maxim “I think…”(Sober 156). It is from this foundational belief  that he 
inferred the second part of  the maxim “… I am.” For Descartes, the subject’s existence was predi-
cated on the fact that this “thinking thing” could think away from the influence of  the external 
world. The fact that the subject could think away from everything, meant that thinking was in-
dubitable. It is this isolation, containment, and distinctiveness which creates the binary thinking in 
the field of  hermeneutics during the nineteenth century. 
This very brief  discussion about Descartes must take place because, as has been stated above, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics responds to the notion of  methodology in interpretative practice. For 
Gadamer this commitment to methodology came about because of  the express desire to know and 
understand objects in the world on their own terms, as things in themselves. This claim on knowl-
edge is linked to concepts of  objectivity and verifiable information. Methodologies are described as 
a means to circumnavigate the subject’s position in relation to the objects under interrogation. 
Gadamer shows in Truth and Method how this understanding is false. The invocation of  Descartes is 
necessary to gain an understanding of  the distinction between subject and object. The distinction 
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between “subjects” and “objects” creates a contested hierarchical space in which both positions are 
vying for the potentially powerful position of  interpreter. 
	 	 1.2 
Prior to Schleiermacher’s theory of  interpretation, hermeneutics entailed the study of  objects that 
were resistant to interpretation and attempted to understand the intended meaning of  the object of  
interpretation (Linge xiii). Schleiermacher introduced the notion of  an “allgemeine Hermeneutik, a 
‘general hermeneutics’, which dealt with the ‘art of  understanding’ as such, which pertained to the 
structure and function of  understanding wherever it occurs” (Palmer 3). Schleiermacher argued that 
hermeneutics was not built around an attempt to understand but rather began from a position of  
misunderstanding. He posited that because the meanings of  words changed throughout time and 
varied according to spatial locations as well, hermeneutics always began with misunderstanding 
(Linge xiii). This is a central intervention for Gadamer’s hermeneutics because it takes as its starting 
point Hegel’s understanding of  art as “something past” (Hegel 11). The text has finished and the 
interpreter must make sense of  it. This is something that Gadamer challenges by exploring the rela-
tionship between the interpretative moment and the experience of  a work of  art. For Schleiermach-
er, however, this “sense” always begins from a position of  misunderstanding because the text “fin-
ished” in a different historicality.  
Schleiermacher’s solution to the problem of  misunderstanding was to recreate the historical context 
out of  which the text emerged and remove the temporal biases of  the interpreter. The text ceased to 
mean anything contemporaneously and the interpretation was focused on understanding what it 
had meant to the “original” reader (Gadamer 197). It is crucial to note that Schleiermacher does 
not argue that the contemporary reader should become the “original” reader. Instead he argues that 
in order for understanding to take place, and misunderstanding avoided, the reader must be on 
equal footing with the author; “the aim is to understand the writer better than he understood him-
self…” (Gadamer 198). For Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic endeavour, 
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speech and writing of  whatever type become the spontaneous overflow of  genius…Schleier-
macher sees them [texts] only as ‘artistic thoughts’; they are understood when methods are 
found that bring back to life the creative processes and intentions that engendered them. 
(Warnke 14)  
Schleiermacher also conceived of  the hermeneutic circle; a process of  relation between the whole of  
the text and its component parts. Engagement with the hermeneutic circle constructed by the text 
required the reader to oscillate between the sentences, words, letters and punctuation of  the text, 
and the apparent overall intention of  the work (Maclean 124). The intended meaning of  the work 
was under constant revision as the interpreter engaged with the parts and related them to the whole. 
However, because of  the rigorous historical re-situating of  the interpreter this process was deemed 
finite, and the analysis of  the hermeneutic circle could be completed. Despite the acknowledgement 
of  the cyclical nature of  revision involved in interpretation, Schleiermacher saw this process as tele-
ological because the historical moment had ended and the reader could understand the text entirely 
if  s/he successfully recreated the historical moment from which the text emerged. 
While the hermeneutic circle in Schleiermacher’s conception renewed the focus on the relationship 
between form and content, it did not extend to the levels propounded by Heidegger and Gadamer. 
Both the latter theorists saw the hermeneutic circle as including the text, its context, its form, the 
thought process it expressed, and the position from which the contemporary reader approached the 
document. Crucially for Gadamer this process was finite as well, but in the sense that the current 
reader would die and his/her historical location would thus cease to be the contemporary locale. It 
is this more fluid conception of  historicality that encouraged Gadamer to discuss the effect a work 
of  art has on the contemporaneous experience of  an interpreter. Schleiermacher, despite arguing 
that, “[t]he author can only really be understood by going back to the origin of  the thought” never 
related the hermeneutic circle to these much larger dynamic forces (Gadamer 197).  
The hermeneutical commitment of  Schleiermacher saw an important shift away from the proposed 
notion of  objective language towards an acknowledgement of  the fluidity of  meaning, in the con-
cept of  the hermeneutical circle the text’s meaning was under revision during the interpretative 
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process. However, this fluidity forced the construction of  a methodology in an attempt to regain the 
supposed sure footing of  objective knowledge. Schleiermacher’s theory aligns itself  with the objec-
tivist position: the temporary position of  the reader is a problem to be overcome through a rigorous 
adherence to historical reconstruction. Through this reconstruction the “original” meaning of  cer-
tain words and phrases could be gleaned. Schleiermacher’s conception of  hermeneutic endeavour 
sought to reinstate the “original” intended meaning, erasing the misunderstanding that contempo-
rary engagement necessarily brought to bear upon the text. Perhaps the biggest contention with this 
view is that it removes any experience of  the text the reader may have. Instead of  being open to the 
claims made by the text on the reader’s contemporary location, the text becomes a coded document 
with a historical key. Of  course this was intended to remove the affect the reader’s contemporary 
location may have on his/her interpretative endeavour but it has the unfortunate fallout of  reducing 
the text to coded document rather than allowing the work of  art to transform the reader’s under-
standing of  his/her position in history (Bernasconi xiv). 
Schleiermacher’s biographer, Wilhelm Dilthey, argued that this process could be taken one step fur-
ther. Dilthey distinguished between understanding and explanation as two separate and distinct 
forms of  knowledge. Dilthey proposed that explanations for why various objects behaved the way 
they did was to be strictly confined to the realm of  science. While understanding, which required a 
more empathetic level of  “knowing” was the domain of  the human sciences, “understanding has to 
do with the experiencing of  other subjects and minds than our own; it relies on the meaningfulness 
of  all forms of  expression in which experience is couched...meaningfulness bestowed upon expres-
sion by interpretation.” (Maclean 124-125) For the interpreter to enter the world of  the author 
whose text is under interrogation, the interpreting subject would have to negate his/her own tempo-
ral location. The onus is thus thrust upon the subject to position him/herself  in the “life-world” of  
the author at the moment of  conception for the text.  
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For Dilthey the reader's task was “to recover the original life-world they [textual documents] betoken 
and to understand the other person (the author or historical agent) as he understood himself ” (Linge 
xiv). Gadamer describes Dilthey’s hermeneutic practice as a process of  continued “othering”, as in-
terpretation for Dilthey is always the judging of  an “alien individuality” which must be understood 
“according to its own concepts and criteria of  value” (Gadamer 204). Gadamer’s response to 
Dilthey’s perceived epistemic colonialism is to re-situate the text as an effective “object”. By allowing 
the text to be an active influence in the interpretative process, rather than a static interpretable “ob-
ject”, the dialogic aspect of  philosophical hermeneutics takes on a more equitable hue denying the 
domination of  the interpretative conversation by either text or interpreter.  
Both Schleiermacher and Dilthey explore the negative aspects of  the interpreter’s historical position 
in relation to a text, positioning the interpreting subject in contrast to the “truths” offered by the in-
terpretable object. However, by exploring these negative aspects the assumption is that historical 
knowledge is finite in nature and that the reader can extricate him/herself  from a contemporary 
historical location. The contemporary interpreter can look back and extract information from an 
epoch because that epoch has come to an end and can thus be considered an annal to be employed 
when necessary. This fails to take heed of  the continuum of  historical Tradition, and positions his-
torical knowledge as a stagnant force which has no bearing on contemporary life.  
Schleiermacher and Dilthey’s positions describe the text as a silent partner in the interpretative ex-
change, disavowing any effect it may have upon the reader’s understanding of  it. This comes about 
as a consequence of  both theorists desire to deride any effect the contemporary reader may have on 
the interpretation of  the text. For Schleiermacher this process overcame misunderstanding and for 
Dilthey this explored the distance between scientific knowledge and more empathetic (divinatory) 
knowledges attributed to the human sciences. Gadamer poses the disingenuous question of  whether 
it is indeed possible to deny a present location by simply adopting an attitude or by applying a 
method (Linge xiv). For Gadamer’s hermeneutics, 
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It is only by way of  the past that we have access to the present, and yet it is in the present and 
by way of  what is most new and unforseeable in it that we discover the resources of  the past. 
(Bernasconi xviii)  
Methodologies betray the implicit assumptions of  the methodology rather than revealing anything 
about the objects they are applied to. Gadamer’s simple response to Schleiermacher and Dilthey’s 
desire to remove the subject via methodology is to show how the subject is always caught up in the 
methodology itself. It is impossible to extricate the subject from their present location. Gadamer 
shows this to be the case through a process which involves a rejuvenation of  the concepts of  pre-
judgement, Tradition and authority. In order for this to be properly expounded upon, I will move on 
to a brief  discussion of  Heidegger’s conception of  historical Being and the fore-structures of  knowl-
edge. 
		 	 1.3 
Cristina Lafont, in her essay “Hermeneutics”, claims that Heidegger’s boldest move in his opus Being 
and Time is his conception that philosophy is hermeneutic (Lafont 265. My emphasis).  This concep9 -
tion is brought about because Heidegger extends the notion of  interpretation to include interpreta-
tion of  human being: “to be human is not primarily to be a rational animal, but first and foremost 
to be a self-interpreting animal” (Lafont 265). For Heidegger, 
[u]nderstanding was no longer seen as a method of  the cultural sciences to be counterposed 
to natural scientific explanation, but as a fundamental structure of  human existence, a mode 
of  being more basic than scientific activity (Mendelson 52). 
Thus hermeneutics and interpretation were no longer isolated to an engagement with texts whose 
meaning was not immediately apparent, or correcting misunderstandings that arise through the 
course of  time. Instead interpretation became an active part of  bringing the individual’s Being into 
 Heidegger’s thought continued to develop after Being and Time but Gadamer did not incorporate Heidegger’s later 9
works into his hermeneutical endeavours. As such, this section will focus on Gadamer’s employment of  Heidegger’s 
“hermeneutic” turn. 
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the world. This notable shift away from a hermeneutics of  utility towards a hermeneutics of  ontol-
ogy is Heidegger’s greatest influence on the philosophical hermeneutics of  Gadamer because philo-
sophical hermeneutic fashions itself  as an ontological pursuit, rather than an epistemological study 
or formula. 
Heidegger’s Being and Time is an extended investigation into the meaning of  Being (Dreyfus 
&Wrathall 3). He designates the term Dasein to encapsulate the “entity” that interrogates what it 
means to be. Dasein becomes Heidegger’s “way of  referring both to the human being and the type 
of  Being that humans have” (Inwood 22). This concept is crucial for the notion of  historicality 
which engages with the subjectivist/objectivist positions in hermeneutical theory.  
For Heidegger, the greatest challenge facing philosophy is that the world exists. In his formulation 
Descartes’ cogito is reversed. Thus for Heidegger, the process becomes “I am, therefore I think.” 
The challenge for thinking is bringing Dasein into contact with the being-ness of  the world. Perhaps 
the best way to speak of  Dasein is to describe it as “not a definite actual thing, but the possibility of  
various ways of  being” (Inwood 23 My emphasis). The word “possibility” is what makes me think 
this formulation of  Dasein is a productive one. Effectively, Dasein is constantly being reviewed and 
performing the review. It is always-already interpreting being, and it brings certain fore-structures 
into play: fore-conceptions, fore-sights and fore-havings to bear upon the world (Inwood 46). How-
ever Dasein, and its progenitive understanding of  being, exists in a constant state of  flux because 
these fore-conceptions, fore-sights and fore-havings are constantly being revised in relation to the 
ontic objects that allow Dasein to “be there” and be described (Inwood 21).  
Heidegger distinguishes between two questions, the question of  ontics (the description of  beings) 
and the question of  ontology (“ways or modes of  Being”). This distinction in the line of  philosophi-
cal interrogation becomes a distinction between so called objects-in-the-world and the being-ness of  
these objects (Dreyfus &Wrathall 3). Entities which possess an ontical existence, objects which show 
themselves to be-in-the-world can be distinguished from those that possess an ontological Being (Da-
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sein), a phenomenological existence situating them in time, space and in relation to the experience 
of  them (Bleicher 99). This distinction is Heidegger’s critique of  the philosophical tradition which 
sought to explain phenomenological Being through descriptions of  ontic properties. For Heidegger, 
the question should be aimed at understanding what structures make it possible for human Being 
(Dreyfus & Wrathall 3). This distinction is not exclusive. Instead, in Heidegger we find the introduc-
tion of  a bleeding between “objects” and “subjects”. Objects are influenced by the subjects which 
interpret them and, simultaneously, subjects are influenced by the objects. This crucially introduces 
a renewed focus on the experience of  the objects in the world. Again this observation rather than 
distinction, reinforces the fluidity of  the concept of  Dasein. Heidegger claimed that this process of  
interaction was kept fluid by the processional movement of  time itself. The location of  Dasein with-
in a temporal framework is the concept of  historicality. Dasein comes to be aware of  its continued 
engagement with itself  through an ecstatic self-relation. In which Being is simultaneously present, 
actively interrogating the past and projecting  into the future. The concept of  historicality gestures 
towards a simultaneity of  being within a historical framework and understanding the historiological 
significance of  this framework which comes about through the act of  interpretation. 
  1.4 
Historicality allows Gadamer to acknowledge the temporal location of  both the reader and the text. 
The separate locales occupied by both parties are known by Gadamer as the hermeneutical situa-
tion. These hermeneutical situations possess their own historically imbued fore-sights, fore-concep-
tions and fore-havings which must be negotiated. Thus, unlike the somewhat divinatory process of  
accessing the life-world of  the author and denying the present situation of  a reader, the interaction 
of  these hermeneutical situations fully acknowledges the temporal differences and suggests that it is 
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these differences which become productive spaces in which the claims made on the reader by the 
text can be heard and interrogated.  
Gadamer’s theory of  philosophical hermeneutics is a study of  interpretations without a telos, re-
moved from a nihilistic sense of  relativism. This shift is crucial when considering the interaction of  
text and reader. Gadamer’s rejuvenation of  the notion of  prejudgement, brought about by Heideg-
ger’s reconfiguration of  historicality, allows the text to influence the reader and vice-a-versa. For 
Gadamer the effects of  the text upon the prejudgements of  the reader, effects which are made pro-
nounceable when the reader is actively influencing the text through his/her interpretation, is the 
space in which a dialogic mediation of  meaning takes place—“understanding is not a reconstruction 
but a mediation” (Linge xvi). The fluidity of  historicality allows the integrity of  both the text and 
the reader to be maintained whilst under interrogation.  
In Gadamer’s hermeneutical description what I have called the integrity of  the text (essentially the 
meaning that the text brings to bear in the interpretative dialogue with the reader), is an essential 
component to the exchange of  prejudgements in the dialogic exchange. Gadamer argues that in or-
der for understanding to take place the reader must consider the text a coherent and unified object: 
in possession of  completeness (305). He considers this initial projection to be a “formal condition of  
all understanding” through interpretation (305). This means that the text must initially be thought 
to have a meaning to convey. This process in turn allows for a more equitable dialogic exchange be-
tween the reader and the text. In order for the interpretative dialogue to begin, both parties must 
acknowledge that the dialogue will be “about something” (Linge xxi). The text guides the dialogue, 
however it does not confine the dialogue to the text.  
The concept of  completion is a point of  intervention for this dissertation. This is because both Watt 
and Naked Lunch challenge this conception of  an earnest interpretative dialogue which grants each 
interlocutor a position of  unity, coherency, and in possession of  something to say. Both texts chal-
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lenge the reader’s location in relation to the text. Watt positions the reader as a spectator—relegated 
to engaging with the interpretative efforts of  Watt who lacks a historicity. Instead of  the reader en-
gaging with the meaning of  the text in the interpretative exchange, the reader engages with the de-
ferred interpretations of  the world of  the novel provided by Watt. Of  course Watt’s interpretations 
are provided by Sam so the deferral slips further away from the reader. Watt’s lack of  historicity 
dramatises a failed hermeneutic directly linked to Sam’s failure to understand Watt. On the other 
hand Naked Lunch drags the reader into the bowels of  the text, manipulating him/her into a position 
of  anxiety—unsure of  what to believe in a text that seems self-destructively critical of  language. The 
texts each represent possible reactions and challenges to Gadamer’s notion of  completeness. Watt 
alienates the reader and Naked Lunch relies on the reader to bring its treatment of  control and lan-
guage into the interpretative dialogue through the anxious effects of  the text. This will be a key ten-
sion in the engagement with Beckett’s early hermeneutic novel and Burroughs’s Naked Lunch. In or-
der to explore this tension, more needs to be said in relation to Gadamer’s conception of  effective 
history and crucially his proposition that “Being that can be understood is language” (Gadamer 
xxxi).  
	 	 1.5 
The Enlightenment’s greatest effect on the contemporary field of  hermeneutics was to foster the 
suspicion of  “prejudice”. Gadamer suggests that the Enlightenment was “prejudiced against the no-
tion of  prejudice” (Gadamer 283). The Enlightenment’s veneration of  rationality, an unbounded, 
immutable rationality, allowed history to influence and effect interpretation behind the back of  the 
interpreter (Gadamer 38). The hermeneutical situation of  the interpreter and the text respectively, 
deny any false claims to objectivity made on behalf  of  an immutable Reason. The hermeneutic sit-
uation is described by Gadamer as involving Tradition which operates through a conception of  
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“effective history”. Tradition is understood through language and, for Gadamer, exists as a central 
component to understanding gleaned through interpretation.  
Tradition is an all encompassing, pervasive force for Gadamer’s hermeneutics: “[w]e are always sit-
uated within Traditions, and this is no objectifying process …” (Gadamer 294). Tradition, in this 
formulation, is not a static exemplar handed down through the eons. Instead when Gadamer speaks 
of  Tradition he means the historically inherited situation of  the reader and the text. These historical 
situations are questioned and negotiated as history moves on. Tradition must be questioned in order 
for it to be rationally sublimated, or else it operates “behind [the reader’s] back” (Gadamer 38). By 
becoming aware of  prejudgement the reader becomes aware of  Tradition. The reader comes to 
know his/her and the text’s prejudgements through language. As such, Tradition manifests itself  in 
language via the prejudgements exposed during interpretative dialogic exchange. 
If  Tradition permeates all aspects of  Being and can only come into pronounceability through the 
interaction of  prejudgements, then responding to the claims made on the reader and the text by 
Tradition becomes a key tenet of  interpretative praxis. In Gadamer’s formulation the “very idea of  
a situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective 
knowledge of  it.” (Gadamer 312) The fact that the reader cannot extricate themselves from the 
hegemony of  Tradition suggests that the interpellation of  critical engagement with texts is more 
complicated than he may suggest. This is the criticism that Habermas offers of  philosophical 
hermeneutics. Habermas argues that Tradition, in Gadamer’s formulation, cannot account for ra-
tional reflection because reflection allows for critical engagement with distorting ideologies in the 
interpretative process. However, Habermas’s criticism rests on a conception of  a totalising Tradi-
tion. As such to respond critically to Tradition, from within the Tradition itself, speaks to the em-
bedded-ness of  language in the Traditionary procession. In order to interrogate this process, the 
reader must be aware of  the interpellation of  Tradition through language in the interpretative dia-
logue; a process available to the Gadamerian reader who remains alert to the claims made on him/
her by the text in the interpretative dialogue.  
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Tradition is an essential component of  philosophical hermeneutics encouraging the interpreter to 
oscillate in dialogue with his/her present location and the Traditionary aspects of  history: “[u]nder-
standing is to be thought of  less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of  
Tradition” (Gadamer 302). This process of  Tradition requires an interrogative awareness on the 
part of  the reader to any aspects of  the dialogic exchange that may appear habitual. In the case of  
Watt and Naked Lunch the disruption of  interpretative praxis encourages this interrogation. The dis-
ruptions cause the interpretative discussion to focus on the effects of  the novel, rather than solely on 
their content. In turn I will argue that the effect that the novels have on the expanded hermeneutic 
circle is intimately bound up with understanding the subject-matter of  the novels. The novels frac-
ture the monolithic notion of  Tradition that is captured by philosophical hermeneutics, showing 
that a multiplicity of  Traditions create a hermeneutical situation. Tradition becomes a key compo-
nent in the expanded hermeneutic circle in which Gadamer and the early Heidegger work:  
Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves in as much 
as we understand, participate in the evolution of  Tradition, and hence further determine it 
ourselves. Thus the circle of  understanding is not a “methodological” circle, but describes an 
element of  the ontological structure of  understanding. (Gadamer 305) 
The constant renewal and revision of  Tradition necessitates that the reader notice its effects in the 
interpretative dialogue. Gadamer uses the term “effective history” to explain this aspect of  Tradi-
tion. Tradition is simultaneously delimiting and liberating for the interpretative process. The demar-
cated spaces in which interpretation can take place are an integral part of  the interpretation itself—
they simultaneously define the scope and create the possibility of  interpretation. Gadamer says, 
“understanding will always retain the consciousness that we too belong to that world, and correla-
tively, that the work belongs to our world.” (301). But this “consciousness” of  belonging is necessari-
ly tethered to a historical locale and therefore cannot be considered to be free of  the influence of  
history. Effective history is a description of  the reader’s interaction with their historicality and the 
effect the historical location exerts over the interpretative dialogue. The influence Tradition exerts 
on the reader’s interpretative praxis is the effect of  history. This effect is manifested in the disrup-
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tions to understanding that the reader encounters in the texts because it these instances of  being 
“pulled up short” in interpretation which encourage interpretative engagement (Gadamer 280). 
Once more Gadamer’s theoretical assumption in these instances of  “being pulled up short” is that 
the text has something to say. This assumption exists because otherwise the text would not be able to 
encourage interpretation. Where this assumption becomes dangerous, and potentially exclusionary, 
is for texts that could be considered avant-garde; texts like Watt and Naked Lunch.  
These texts explicitly respond a to a literary tradition in which the verisimilitude of  art, and expres-
sion more broadly, was never debatable. I will argue that Watt and Naked Lunch pull the reader up 
short by not only encouraging interpretative engagement but by constructing interpretative en-
gagement as their subject-matter. Thus it is not dangerous or prescriptively delimiting to suggest the 
texts have something to say: the danger lies in assuming that they are whole, unified and coherent in 
the representation of  this something. I would amend Gadamer’s conception of  completion to allow 
for interpretative interjection when the text challenges the notion of  completion. To acknowledge 
this disruption and interrogate its influence in the interpretative exchange allows for a meta-
hermeneutic discussion. In Naked Lunch the anxious interpretative effects of  the text on the reader 
speak to the manifestation of  its hermeneutic subject matter during the interpretative exchange. 
Without this exchange the text does not have these effects and the explicit subject-matter of  Naked 
Lunch (control) is lost. The awareness of  the reader when reading Naked Lunch that the text is trying 
to manipulate or “con” him/her into a complicit relationship with the authority of  the text is an in-
tegral component in understanding Burroughs’s novel. Burroughs’s concerns with language as a 
medium of  control have a lot to say in relation to Tradition’s relationship to language. By exploring 
Burroughs’s negative relationship with “The Word” I will be able to explore the implications of  this 
for Tradition in its interpellated manifestation through language. But these interpretations are nec-
essarily linked to the interpretative relationship between text and reader. Without allowing the pre-
judgements of  both parties to challenge one another in interpretation, the effects of  the novels on 
the reader’s engagement cannot be adequately disclosed. The implication of  this unacknowledged 
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effect is that the texts remain, in part, misunderstood. As such Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneu-
tics, through its explicit desire to encourage the reader to remain alert to the claims of  the text, be-
comes an illuminating interpretative ally when confronting the embedded-ness of  language in Tra-
dition. Burroughs’s novel anticipates Gadamer’s observations by performing this conception of  Tradi-
tion during the interpretative procedure. The reader’s awareness that the text is trying to “con” 
him/her becomes a central feature of  the meaning of  Naked Lunch, a meaning that is available 
through Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.   
Gadamer argues that objectivist interpretative practice constructs the reader as a conduit for the 
text’s ideas and this attempt to elevate textual integrity ultimately costs the text something: the pos-
sibility of  exercising an influence upon the reader. By denying historically effected consciousness the 
text can no longer interact with the reader’s hermeneutical situation and cannot pose its questions. 
It is through Tradition that the prejudgements of  the reader, and of  the text for that matter, are 
venerated, rather than repressed. If  the text is denied this influence, the meaning of  the novels is 
partially elided.     
The historical location of  the reader and the text are understood to be historical horizons within the 
Gadamerian schema. These horizons are the hermeneutical situations of  both interlocutors as well 
as the renewed hermeneutical situation borne out of  the exchange. The horizons are constructed by 
the prejudgements of  the reader and the text. These prejudgements interact in the interpretative 
moment. It is in this moment that the horizons of  both text and reader are “fused” to create a new 
interpretative horizon. This process is non-teleological because it is understood that the fusion of  
horizons will continue in perpetuity with every reader’s interaction with the text (Linge xix).  
The fusion of  horizons is an engagement with the prejudgements of  the text and those of  the read-
er. These prejudgements are negotiated through a somewhat conservative relation to the authority 
of  the text (Warnke 78). This deference to the authority of  the text is predicated upon the initial dia-
logic assumption that the text has something to say (Warnke 87). This is an arguably earnest under-
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standing of  dialogic interaction and one that becomes complicated in texts which appear to be ex-
plicitly aware of  an engagement with a reader. It is also this appeal to authority which creates con-
sternation around the possibility of  critique within the interpellated realm of  Tradition. However, in 
both Watt and Naked Lunch the reader is presented with a multiplicity of  horizons. These horizons 
constantly fracture and fragment the texts, and present a potentially productive, rather than deferen-
tial, relationship with Gadamer’s monolithic conception of  Tradition. 
Both novels present multiple historical locations, and fragmented versions of  Gadamer’s description 
of  horizons. Naked Lunch achieves this most overtly in its formal construction: a mosaic interplay be-
tween routines that present recurring characters and events in differing locations through the text. 
Watt sees a fictionalised narrative voice presenting Watt’s story of  how he came to Knott’s employ-
ment and ultimately met up with said fictional narrator, Sam. The text is present in multiple tempo-
ralities as it relates itself  to Watt’s retelling as well as the construction of  the narrative of  hindsight. 
Thus it is not one horizon in either text which the reader must interact with. Instead it is within the 
interplay amongst these horizons and the reader’s historical location, that the prejudgements of  
both interlocutors come to bear upon the interpretative moment.  
In Gadamer’s use of  the word “prejudgement” he means something akin to Heidegger’s notion of  
“fore-structure”; when interacting with anything, anyone or themselves, the interpreter brings a cer-
tain level of  pre-judgement to bear. When Dilthey and Schleiermacher propose that the interpreter 
recreate the life-world of  the author in an attempt to negate the interpreter’s historically imbued 
prejudgements they are ultimately constructing the “tyranny of  hidden prejudice”, disallowing a 
conscious examination of  the prejudgements informed by the movement of  Tradition (Gadamer 
282). Again, this limits the effect a text can produce during the interpretative exchange and sacri-
fices aspects of  the text’s meaning. It is important to note that this effect of  the text is one that is 
manifested in the interpretative dialogue. The reader makes certain assumptions regarding the in-
terpretation of  the text. The texts (Naked Lunch and Watt) challenge these assumptions and influence 
the hermeneutic exchange by representing an awareness that they are being read. By eliminating 
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the chance for prejudgements to enter into the dialogue and therefore come to light, the Romantic 
hermeneuticians were relying on the authority of  the text’s prejudgements to be benevolent, and 
more worryingly, in possession of  the truth content of  the work. It is through an active, considered 
dialogic exchange that prejudgement comes to light, is challenged, and further embroiled in the 
process of  horizonal fusion. This is a hermeneutic aspect of  the text itself  and whilst it is an effect of  
the hermeneutic engagement, it does contribute to the interpretation and subsequent understanding 
of  the text. As such, by denying the text this level of  involvement, Romantic hermeneuticians failed 
to understand aspects of  the text. 
The multiplicity of  horizons presented by Watt and Naked Lunch respond to the description of  au-
thority Gadamer provides in Truth and Method. When Gadamer talks of  prejudgement he distin-
guishes between over hastiness and prejudgement that is handed down through authority (Gadamer 
284). Prejudgements borne from over hastiness are considered lazy whereas prejudgements arising 
out of  an authoritative position are not always immediately apparent nor immediately negative, 
“authority is not always wrong” (Gadamer 33). However due to the Enlightenment and Romantic 
eras distrust of  authority, this statement from Gadamer has come to represent his conservatism, 
rather than an acknowledgment that the text may be in possession of  “something to say”. Authorita-
tive prejudgements come to light when engaging with a text by allowing the text to interrogate the 
reader’s hermeneutic position. This is an inescapable aspect of  interpretation because it is in this 
interrogation that the text pulls the reader up short. This conception of  authority emerging in the 
interaction with a text is one that is expressly challenged by Burroughs’s novel. Naked Lunch sets itself  
up as an authority on “control”. The text itself  is concerned with expressing the totalising interpen-
etration of  control. However, by establishing itself  as an authority on the subject of  control, Bur-
roughs’s novel appears to contradict itself. This contradiction articulates itself  in the anxiously suspi-
cious hermeneutic the reader is encouraged to work within when reading the mosaic Naked Lunch. 
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Naked Lunch appears to dramatise the concerns around the possibility for ideology critique within a 
philosophical hermeneutic framework.  
Authority, and the possibility of  its reincorporation in the interpretative process, coupled with the 
pervasive notion of  Tradition, exposes the complex possibility of  historical critique within the de-
scription of  philosophical hermeneutics. The description proffered by Gadamer states that under-
standing is the “successful appropriation of  Tradition” by the reader, in which s/he comes to know 
that Tradition belongs to them and they belong to it (25). This appropriation is not a blind accep-
tance of  Traditionary values but involves the rigorous interrogation of  the inherited forms this Tra-
dition assumes. However, if  language is “the reservoir of  Tradition” and the “medium in and 
through which” the reader “exist[s] and perceive[s]” of  the “world” then philosophical hermeneu-
tics appears to be asking the reader to place Tradition in critical conversation with itself, exposing a 
compromised and conflicting relationship. Truth and Method states that Tradition is “not a process 
that experience teaches us to know and govern; it is language.” (366) If  Tradition is language then 
critiquing the processes of  Tradition is further problematised because of  the incorporation of  lan-
guage into the Traditionary moment. 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics relies on the interlocution which takes place between text 
and reader. This dialogue is a process of  sublimation for both object and subject. Philosophical 
hermeneutics relies on an awareness of  historicality in order to engage and interrogate prejudge-
ment. Thus the reader is caught up in the dialogic exchange whilst maintaining a critical self-aware-
ness. However, when philosophical hermeneutics engages with texts that are overtly self-conscious 
regarding their construction and the construction of  the reader this critical self-awareness becomes 
a pronounced component in the interpretative process. It ceases to operate as part of  the system of  
understanding Gadamer describes and instead becomes an active part of  the interpretation itself. 
This is certainly the case for the texts in this dissertation: Beckett’s Watt and Burroughs’s Naked Lunch 
both seek to disrupt the reader’s access to meaning in order to cultivate a heightened awareness of  
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the interpretative assumptions the reader is practicing. Philosophical hermeneutics will allow me to 
investigate this heightened awareness of  the text’s effect in the interpretative dialogue. It is also 
found to be compromised by an engagement with self-conscious texts—texts which are simultane-
ously aware of  the reader, the modes of  reading s/he wishes to practice, and dependent on the 
reader for the full extent of  their subject-matter to be conveyed—challenge philosophical 
hermeneutics’s description of  completion and unity in meaning. However by placing philosophical 
hermeneutics in conversation with a self-conscious text, the Gadamerian framework becomes unset-
tled and influenced by the text as well. It is in this engagement that the self-conscious awareness of  
the interpretative “object” presents challenges and crucially potential responses to criticisms of  
philosophical hermeneutics. It is through this dual relationship that the texts respond to Gadamer’s 
theory. While philosophical hermeneutics is a framework, which allows me to explore the influence 
the texts exert over the reader, the texts themselves do not meekly assimilate philosophical 
hermeneutics. They challenge some of  its fundamental assumptions. By analysing these challenges 
(somewhat contrived in the relation of  Gadamer’s theory to these texts in this dissertation) Watt and 
Naked Lunch present ways of  thinking about Gadamer’s critics.  
The interpellation and conflicting relationship of  Tradition with itself  is a criticism offered by Jür-
gen Habermas. Habermas argues that Gadamer’s philosophical schema assimilates too much of  
Tradition and sacrifices the potential for ideology critique. Whilst I think that there are aspects of  
this critique that hold water against Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a universal schema 
for understanding, I think that both Watt and Naked Lunch, when engaging with Gadamer’s frame-
work, offer potential responses to this criticism. This will be explored and discussed throughout the 
dissertation. In order to gain access to the severity of  Habermas’s criticism I need to explain the 
concept of  dialogue that Gadamer uses.  
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The process of  dialogic engagement is described in Truth and Method as a game and Gadamer em-
ploys a concept of  play to elucidate this “game”. Gadamer describes play in very clear terms, 
all playing is a being-played. The attraction of  a game…consists precisely in the fact that the 
game masters the players…The real subject of  the game…is not the player but instead the 
game itself. (Gadamer 111). 
In Gadamer’s conception of  the act of  playing, the subject is not only wholly absorbed in the 
process of  the game but comes to be a part of  the very fabric of  the rules and regulations that dic-
tate the play itself. Play is medial, renews itself  constantly and cannot be thought of  as repetitious 
(Valgenti 71). The subject becomes absorbed in the dialogic back and forth between him/herself  
and the text, yet remains aware of  the bound-ness of  the exchange to the rules of  the game. It is in 
this exchange that the subject’s historical horizon is brought forth and interrogated by the text’s own 
historical horizon. The mediation between the two positions is the space in which Gadamer’s play 
happens. This is the instance in which the reader’s prejudgements, informed by his/her Tradition 
and interrogated through the process of  historically effected consciousness, interact with the pre-
judgements of  the text. This dialogical engagement, which takes the form of  play, is the site in 
which interpretative action takes place.  
The dialogic model Gadamer uses when describing interpretative exchange is the Socratic model. 
Socratic dialogue takes as a starting point the docta ignorantia (the doctrine of  ignorance). By ac-
knowledging the finitude of  knowledge the reader may have about the text’s subject-matter, the dia-
logue can begin from a position of  openness (Warnke 102). This openness acknowledges the poten-
tial for the text to teach the reader something through the interpretative dialogue. This in turn ad-
vances the horizonal interplay, which affects the renewed position of  Tradition. As Warnke astutely 
notes,  
Gadamer’s point in equating hermeneutic understanding with dialogue, then, is that the 
former is a learning experience. In attempting to understand a text or other aspect of  the 
Tradition, we both bring that object into our world, illuminate the meaning it has for us, and 
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transform our own previous perspective. Hermeneutics involves mediation or, in other words, 
a capacity to see the significance of  a truth-claim for our own situation. (104) 
Dialogue then, is the crucial aspect of  hermeneutic engagement which allows the reader to make 
sense of  the subject-matter the text presents. To phrase this another way, dialogue allows the reader 
to find the effects of  the text’s subject-matter on his/her “world”. Of  course in the process of  fusion 
the reader and the text’s prejudgements are challenged and interrogated. It is this process that allows 
for the distinction between productive prejudgements and reductive or, even, destructive prejudge-
ments to take place. The reader cannot approach the text with this knowledge in hand. S/he must 
remain open to the questions of  the text, remain aware of  the hermeneutical situation from which 
the text is approaching him/her, and remain aware of  the hermeneutical situation in which they are 
approaching the text. It must be noted then that this is not a dialogue from ignorance towards knowl-
edge. Instead this is a dialogue which renews the experience of  ignorance in new historicalities. Dia-
logic exchange exposes ad infinitum the prejudgements of  both reader and text in ever renewed posi-
tions. This requires the reader to assume that the text has something to say, and that s/he can learn 
from the text. This is described as the experience of  the text by Gadamer and it creates the equi-
table dialogue he deems necessary for interpretative exchange. Yet this does require a level of  com-
fort with the unknowable, “ineffable” (Beckett 52) on the part of  the reader as s/he continually en-
counters aspects of  the interpretative exchange which draw him/her up short. It is through this me-
dial dialogue that the concept of  “complete-ness” seems out of  place in relation to two novels which 
distinctly challenge the relationship between text and reader. The text can never be “complete” 
without the reader and the reverse is true for any interpretation offered of  the text. It is in the meta-
hermeneutic of  the text, in which the reader is encouraged to interrogate the ways s/he approaches 
the novels that this conception of  “completion” is incorporated into the dialogic exchange. By ac-
knowledging the instances that both novels disrupt this conception that they are whole, unified and 
complete, the reader is forced to interrogate his/her relationship to the interpretative dialogue. In a 
sense the concept of  completeness for Gadamer’s dialogue finds its fulfilment in the non-complete-
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ness of  Watt and Naked Lunch. I would equate this to a radical form of  “Negative Capability”, in 
which the texts actively deny monolithic understandings and encourage a comfort in doubt that ini-
tially seems out of  place in philosophical hermeneutics. However, I think Gadamer’s dialogic de-
scription encourages such doubt around interpretation by encouraging the reader to interrogate the 
experience of  the text as an essential part of  its meaning. There is no complete-ness in hermeneuti-
cal exploration through dialogue. Instead the questions of  the text find ever new locations to con-
front the renewable prejudgements of  Tradition.   
In the proceeding chapters I will rely on the theoretical language defined in this section to draw the 
interpretations of  both Naked Lunch and Watt back to their meta-hermeneutic concerns. Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics encourages an engagement with overtly meta-hermeneutic texts be-
cause the theory itself  is open to the questionableness of  meaning and understanding in interpreta-
tion. Habermas’s criticisms surrounding philosophical hermeneutics’s failure to acknowledge the 
systematic distortion that Tradition and ideology may present through language are concerns that 
both novels share with the process of  understanding. This will be the focus of  the close-reading of  
both texts. I will show how the novels make Habermas’s critique explicit, and I will suggest how the 
texts present potential responses to the criticism that aligns language with manipulation and ideolo-
gy. In short I will be analysing the ways Watt and Naked Lunch influence the reader’s interpretative 
exchange by obfuscating aspects of  Gadamer’s earnest conception of  dialogue. Through this analy-
sis I will be able to discuss the consequences of  such challenges for philosophical hermeneutics and 
it is these consequences that I will suggest present responses to Habermas’s monolithic conception 
of  an all pervasive ideology and Tradition.  
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Chapter Two  
Samuel Beckett’s Watt: Multiple Interpreters and Many Horizons 
In an article published in 1972, J.M. Coetzee describes Watt as “an uneven and sometimes anarchic 
work.” (39) In his introductory comments to the 2009 Faber and Faber  edition of  Watt Chris Acker-
ley describes Beckett’s last novel in English as “a curiosity” (vii). These descriptions of  the novel re-
cur throughout the critical oeuvre associated with Watt. It would seem that the novel presents inter-
pretative uncertainty in its reception amongst critics. This was certainly my experience of  Watt, a 
text that I found to be unsettling in its parodic representation of  interpretative endeavour. The opac-
ity of  the text’s titular character and the desire to interpret and understand Watt as fully as possible 
is contested by the text’s parodic representation of  attempts to understand. The anarchism in Watt 
could be its desire to be wholly misunderstood in order to show the failures of  interpretative 
methodologies. The curiosity of  Watt, I found, lies in attempts to articulate this failure in interpreta-
tion through interpretative processes.    
From its inception the text was disjointed, described by Beckett as “only a game, a means of  staying 
sane.”(Ackerley , viii) The novel was written  while Beckett was on the run from the Gestapo during 
the early 1940s the text would only find a publisher in 1953, courtesy of  the same publishing house 
that printed Burroughs’s Naked Lunch in 1959. The text follows the travails of  its eponymous charac-
ter as he arrives on a late night tram, lives and works in servitude at the enigmatic Mr Knott’s house, 
and then finds his way back to the train station. In part III of  the novel the reader is confronted with 
the narrative voice of  the text, a fictional author called Sam. Sam and Watt share conversations 
about Watt’s time at Knott’s and his failure to understand anything about his sojourn there. Thus 
the other three parts of  the four part text appear to be a narrative of  hindsight, narrated from the 
“pavilions” Sam and Watt share in part III (Beckett 129). Beckett’s novel is about interpretation and 
understanding. The simulacra of  Watt that focalises the narrative in parts I, II and IV, expose Sam’s 
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failure to understand the “present” Watt he converses with in part III. This misunderstanding is 
transposed into Sam’s narrative and, as I will argue, dramatises the influence of  “systematic distor-
tion” within the hermeneutic exchange (Warnke 112). This helps elucidate the uncertainty ex-
pressed in the critical responses to Watt because this exploration of  the effect of  a “present” histori-
cal horizon on another places the reader in a precarious, speculative position. The text seemingly 
envelopes multiple horizonal interactions creating what James Knowlson described as a “self-gener-
ating text” (21). In this chapter I will explore what effect this “self-generation” has on the reader’s 
attempts to understand Watt. By doing so I will suggest that the awareness constructed around 
hermeneutical situations offers a response to Habermas’s criticisms of  Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. By encouraging a meta-hermeneutic interpretative discussion the novel shifts the 
aims of  interpretative discourse away from “understanding” the novel towards understanding why 
the “what-ness” of  Watt cannot readily be explained. I think it is important to bear in mind the 
“scholastic memoria technica” Beckett used when composing Watt: “‘who, what, where, by what means, 
why, in what way, when’” (Ackerley ix). This technique is important because it becomes a central 
obfuscation in the text on the whole.  
Gadamer describes the emergence of  hermeneutic engagement as an openness of  the reader to the 
questionableness of  the text “[t]o understand the questionableness of  something is to already be 
questioning” (Gadamer 383). This renewable site of  engagement emerges because the reader un-
derstands that there is a form of  address issued by the text, inviting him/her to understand. But 
Watt’s self-referentiality creates an enclosed narrative sequence in which the reader is not invited to 
hear the questionableness of  Watt, Sam or Knott. Instead, the reader is positioned as a spectator to 
the interpretative manoeuvres Sam and, by extension, Watt exercise. This relationship is further 
complicated by a growing awareness on Watt’s part that he is a character in a novel. The reader’s 
attempts to hear the questions of  the text are thwarted by the text’s responses to its own questions. 
But this does not mean that these are not questionable, and to interrogate the veracity of  Watt’s self-
	 	 "40
interpretation is to “be questioning”. The dialogic engagement with Watt exposes this spectatorial 
locale for the reader. S/he cannot access the interpretable object directly because the interpretable 
object is comprised of  Sam’s interpretations of  Watt’s experiences. Thus the reader begins the in-
terpretable process with second order hermeneutic questions in mind, creating a meta-hermeneutic 
discussion surrounding the “what-ness” of  Watt. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics encourages 
this form of  meta-hermeneutic discussion, and as I will show in the final section of  this chapter, Watt 
anticipates the hubristic anti-teleological conception of  understanding which is central to philosoph-
ical hermeneutics.  
Sam’s interpretation of  Watt emerges in a different historical horizon to the representation of  Watt’s 
experiences in the narrative. The interactions of  Sam and Watt, largely dictated by the weather in 
part III, expose Sam’s attempts to “re-capture” Watt’s interpretations of  Knott. Part of  why this fails 
is explained by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his critique of  Schleiermacher and Dilthey’s attempts to 
regain an understanding of  the initial utterance of  the interpretable object. What Sam fails to take 
into account is that there is an interaction of  historical horizons which occurs between himself  and 
Watt. For the reader, Gadamer’s fusion of  horizons (the site from which understanding can begin) is 
complicated because the horizonal interaction occurs within the ambit of  the text itself. However, 
the reader has access to these multiple horizonal interactions and the “systematic distortion” of  the 
differing hermeneutical situations plays out in the interpretations offered by the text. The text is si-
multaneously constructing the interpretable environment and performing the distortions imposed 
on this environment through the various prejudgements that enter into the horizonal play of  the 
text. Watt, if  such a “summation” is of  any use, can be described as a narrative of  “multiplicity”.  
The multiple-temporalities of  Watt and indeed the multiple “Watts” embedded in the text, express 
themselves in ecstatic relation to the reader. Mark Byron describes Watt as an ecstatic text in a 2004 
article entitled “The Ecstasies of  Watt”. In the article Byron argues for an ecstatic understanding of  
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Watt through an extended engagement with the material construction of  the text. Byron describes 
the novel as “a study in orientation” in which Watt seems to locate itself  in space and time. Ecstasy, 
for Byron, arises specifically out of  the interaction of  the novel with its own position in relation to 
Beckett’s body of  work and the manuscripts that largely comprise Watt (495). The article convinc-
ingly reads moments of  inheritance from the initial Watt notebooks as well as proleptic intrusions 
into Beckett’s future oeuvre in the “final” text of Watt. Byron notes the proleptic intrusion of  Watt in 
Mercier and Camier in which Watt appears and seems to describe Murphy as a dream of  his to Merci-
er (499). However, Byron never extends the discussion to what the consequences of  these observa-
tions will be for the reader of  Watt. The article is a materially focused rendering of  ecstasy whereas I 
wish to discuss the term in relation to the reader who must work to understand a text “that is beside 
itself  and never simply ‘there’.” (Byron 495) I will explore this by interrogating the self-generating 
interpretative processes of  Watt. In so doing I will offer an explanation, via philosophical hermeneu-
tics, for why Watt was “never to know, never never to know” (Beckett 30) anything about his stay at 
Knott’s.  
The word “ecstasy” is derived from the Ancient Greek concept of  ekstasis, to be outside of, or along-
side of  oneself. Aristotle used the term ekstasis to refer to the spectators’s moments of  catharsis when 
watching a play, specifically a tragedy (sec. 9 i449b28). For Aristotle the relation of  the spectator to 
the spectacle encouraged a self-forgetfulness which Gadamer would later describe as a necessary 
component in his description of  play. Immediately the term is related to the effect produced by a 
work of  art on a spectator. It is only in the seventeenth century that the term became associated 
with religious mysticism. The term ekstasis is significant for Martin Heidegger in relation to his con-
cepts of  time in Being and Time. For Heidegger time was not a linear process but instead manifested 
itself  through the present ecstasy of  a person’s being-in-the-world. He distinguished between three 
temporalities that coexist ecstatically: “time steps out of  itself  into past, present and future … the 
future involves being ‘ahead of  oneself ’ and the present ‘being alongside’ things, so the past involves 
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‘already being in’ the world” (Heidegger 317:328f.). Heidegger is suggesting that these three aspects 
of  temporal existence coexist and are embodied by the interpretative manoeuvres of  Dasein coming 
into Being. This is the sense of  ecstasy that Byron is employing in his analysis of  Watt but his render-
ing of  the term is rooted in the intrusion of  the manuscripts into the final text, and the protrusion of  
Watt into Beckett’s larger oeuvre.  
The multiple horizons at play within the narrative framework of  Watt encourage the reader to en-
gage with the second order hermeneutic questions of  why, when, how, by what means, and to what 
end do these interpretations arise in the dialogue. This meta-hermeneutic examination is located in 
the ecstatic relation of  the text to the reader. The ecstatic interpretative relationship is never solely 
about what the text might be “induced to mean” (Beckett 61), but encourages the meta-hermeneutic 
interrogation of  the dialogue itself. 
In the following close-reading I will show that this “locating” of  Watt as a meta-hermeneutic text is 
necessary in order for the novel to explore the representation of  failure in understanding. Watt 
dramatises aspects of  philosophical hermeneutics by the exposition of  this failure and, in many re-
spects, anticipates the theoretical description offered by Gadamer in his 1960 publication Truth and 
Method. It is in this discussion surrounding modes of  understanding and representation that 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics unwittingly finds an ally. Watt exposes the embedded-ness of  
historicality in interpretation and, in so doing, encourages the reader to interrogate their own histor-
ical horizon and Traditionary responses.  
	 	  
	 	 "43
	 	 2.1 
Watt begins and “ends” in a train station. The reader is introduced to Watt through a series of  char-
acters’s interpretative praxis. The opening section establishes the multiplicity of  historical horizons 
by offering up varied interpretations of  Watt’s arrival on a late night tram. The characters who en-
gage in this interpretative moment, Mr Hackett and Tetty Nixon, are caricatured interpreters un-
aware of  their own embedded-ness in a specific hermeneutic situation. Hackett is a parody of  
Cartesian solipsism, he cannot acknowledge the influence his own interaction exerts on the objects 
of  his “intrigue” (Beckett 12). Tetty’s interpretation, which emerges in her interaction with both 
Hackett and Watt, is myopically cloistered by her desire to insert her self  into the world of  the novel. 
Thus both interpreters embody differing aspects of  hermeneutic engagement: Hackett recedes from 
the world of  the novel while Tetty subsumes the hermeneutic experience of  interpretation into her 
own horizon. Neither character can make sense of  Watt because both embody unacknowledged 
prejudgements.  
The opening line of  Watt, “Mr Hackett turned the corner”, suggests a change in perspective, a 
movement around a fixed object to observe a new vista or location from which to perceive. Hackett 
who “saw things a little more clearly when he was still” and whose “walk was an agitated walk” is 
presented with this narrative obstacle; an obstacle which instantly locates him within the world of  
the novel and the spaces off  which the narrative will play itself  off   (Beckett 3). So too, within the 
first couple of  lines, Watt situates the reader in relation to a character who struggles to navigate the 
world of  the novel. Hackett can see better when still. Does this mean that the successful rounding of  
the corner was a fortuitous affair considering the mobility needed to navigate such an obstacle? The 
narrative is provided impetus by overcoming this first obstacle and, as Mark Byron suggests, the 
rounding of  the corner mimics the reader physically turning the page and reading on (497). In this 
sense Hackett and this corner could be seen allegorically to describe the desire on the part of  the 
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reader to understand, turn the corner, see around the corner. This allegory could represent, some-
what tantalisingly, the possibility of  perceiving more than is immediately apparent in a novel that is 
“more concerned with procedures and rhetorical turns than […] narrative line” (Hayman 172). 
But this type of  allegorical reading is parodied in Watt and it is exactly this interpretative assumption 
regarding figures, symbols and allusions that the text complicates by encouraging the reader to en-
gage with the surface level construction of  the narrative. Thus the corner does not become an alle-
gorical allusion, and Hackett’s stilted perambulation does not become a metaphor for the reader’s 
staccato mode of  stringing words together to make a sentence. Instead both of  these narrative mo-
ments are instances where the reader becomes aware of  Hackett’s fallibility as a narrative focal 
point and the rounding of  the corner disrupts the linear progression of  Hackett’s walk. The focus 
on Hackett’s successful navigation of  the corner comes at the price of  the corner itself  which is nev-
er described.   
The utility of  the corner takes full effect when Hackett rounds it and realises that the seat “he 
thought of ”(3) as his is occupied. The rounding of  the corner thus, shifts Hackett’s view of  the 
world of  the novel, a view which is mired by the way he liked to think of  objects in the world as his 
own.  
This seat, the property of  the municipality, or of  the public, was of  course not his, but he 
thought of  it as his. This was Mr Hackett’s attitude towards things that pleased him. He 
knew they were not his, but he thought of  them as his. (3) 
The strange musing of  the narrative voice on Hackett’s relation to things “that pleased him” seems 
to have very little to do with the object itself. These objects in the world of  the novel take the form 
of  pleasant thoughts (incorrect and acknowledged as such) Hackett has regarding them. There’s a 
slippage between the pleasure Hackett derives from the objects and the thought of  possession which 
follows from this pleasure. It is not clear whether the pleasure he derives from said objects instigates 
the thoughts of  possession or whether his thoughts of  possession give him pleasure. He does not 
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seem particularly pleased with the only other aspect of  the seat the reader is aware of: that it is oc-
cupied. This would suggest that it is the thought of  the seat as his rather than the seat itself  that 
“pleases” Mr Hackett. 
In these opening lines the text has located Hackett in relation to an obstacle he is forced to over-
come and placed his thoughts in dialogue with an object in the world of  the novel. Yet this dialogue 
is fraught because Hackett cannot construe of  the object in the world of  the novel and finds himself  
enjoying the sensation of  his own thoughts rather than the object itself. The distinction between ob-
ject and the self-allocation of  Hackett as thinking subject (by Hackett) in this opening scene sees 
Hackett practicing Descartes’s methodology. However, he does not take the next step in the 
methodology of  doubt, he does not reconstruct the world. Instead Hackett enjoys the satisfaction he 
gleans from the indubitable cogito. He appears to enjoy the sensation of  thinking rather than gaining 
any knowledge of  the world around him through this process of  a thinking “I”.  
The reader is encouraged to interrogate Hackett’s version of  the train station, rather than the train 
station itself. Thus the text is ostensibly encouraging a hermeneutic evaluation of  the character’s 
interpretative attempts and because the reader has no access to the train station, except through 
these interpretative efforts, the act of  interpretation becomes an essential component in the under-
standing the narrative.   
This introduction to Hackett’s interaction with the world is a crucial component in understanding 
his reception of  Watt. Hackett describes his intrigue in relation to Watt by interrogating the curiosity 
he feels rather than expressing his thoughts about Watt:  
Mr Hackett did not know when he had been more intrigued, nay, he did not know when he 
had been so intrigued. He did not know either what it was that so intrigued him. What is it 
that so intrigues me, he said, who even the extraordinary, even the supernatural, intrigue so 
seldom, and so little. Here there is nothing in the least unusual, that I can see, and yet I burn 
with curiosity, and with wonder. The sensation is not disagreeable, I must say, and yet I do 
not think I could bear it for twenty minutes, or half  an hour (12). 
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It appears that Hackett is once more focused on his own interaction with objects in the world of  the 
novel rather than the objects themselves. Hackett is more interested in the meta-hermeneutic sensa-
tion of  his intrigue than in the interpretative activity itself. He also seems to derive a pleasure from 
the sensation of  intrigue, a pleasure that might overwhelm him. Hackett has been “pulled up short” 
and finds his solipsistic position questioned by the arrival of  Watt (Gadamer 280).  
When Watt is ejected from the late night tram, Hackett and Tetty Nixon fail to distinguish him from 
a series of  inanimate objects. Watt is mistaken for the wall behind him, a carpet or a tarpaulin held 
together by a piece of  cord around the middle (Beckett 11). This instance in the text establishes Watt 
as an interpretable object. However his misconstrual as object anticipates Gadamer’s concerns sur-
rounding the affect of  an interpretable object on the hermeneutic situation of  the interpreter. The 
mistaken distinction between Watt as subject or Watt as inanimate object, challenges Hackett’s in-
terpretative procedure. What Hackett’s mode of  narrative seemingly fails to note is the experience 
of  engaging with an interpretable object. Watt intrigues him because he cannot place him as object 
in the world without doubt. The intrigue he feels in relation to Watt and the pleasure he derives 
from thinking of  the seat as his, are products of  an influence he fails to articulate. The narrative 
presents Hackett as an interpreter who fails to make sense of  the impact interpretable objects have 
upon his solipsistic hermeneutic. Hackett’s attempts to recede from the world of  the novel lead to 
misunderstanding, captured by his failure to grasp Watt. These thoughts seem to happen to Hackett. 
The narrative does not suggest that Hackett has these thoughts: Hackett is a separate entity from the 
thoughts that give him pleasure. In anticipation of  Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, Hackett 
seems to be showing that he cannot extricate the world from his methodology and ultimately, expos-
es the inability to understand through the subjectivist lens he applies to objects in the world.  
Hackett’s failure to understand the influence his interpretations of  the world effect on and in the 
world of  the novel is an ecstatic instance in Watt. The reader is told that Hackett saw better when he 
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was still, that his stilted perambulation affected the way he perceived of  the world (Beckett 3). When 
Hackett is seated, watching the world wash over him from his static vantage he “saw more clearly”. 
This is a parody of  the subjectivist position which seeks to elevate the individual to an a-historical 
locale, where the influence of  the passage of  time and space can be halted, and ultimately negated. 
The text is relating itself  to this position by exposing the intrigue of  Hackett, rather than any under-
standing of  Watt. 
Hackett appears to lose interpretative authority over the narrative with the introduction of  the 
Nixons. Tetty Nixon’s bestowal of  pity in relation to Hackett initially suggests an infantilisation and 
reduction of  Hackett’s narrative agency. But what is crucial to note is not so much Hackett’s relin-
quishment of  authority but Tetty’s myopic responses to the world of  the novel: 
Oh, my dear, he said, there is Hackett. Hackett, said the lady. What Hackett? Where? You 
know Hackett, said the gentleman. You must have often heard me speak of  Hackett. Hunchy 
Hackett. On the seat. The lady looked attentively at Hackett. So that is Hackett, she said. Yes, 
said the gentleman. Poor fellow, she said. (5. My emphasis) 
Hackett is now the observable object, noted and pitied by the Nixons. Tetty’s first reaction is to ex-
press the interrogative pronoun “What Hackett?”, this query turns Mr Hackett into a noun. Tetty 
then goes on to exclaim that Hackett is a “poor fellow”; a man worthy of  her pity. Hackett is trans-
formed from a noun (an object) into a subject to be pitied. The reader is told that when Hackett and 
Tetty meet, Tetty “stooped towards him, quivering with solicitude” (5. My emphasis). In this instance 
Tetty Nixon is seemingly experiencing a cathartic relation to Hackett, akin to the “self-forgetfulness” 
of  the spectator. She experiences a physical reaction to the pity she bestows upon Hackett and 
Hackett thinks that she may pat his head or stroke his hump (5). Tetty is desperate to perform her 
“self ” on the world of  the novel—regardless of  the effect this has upon this world. Tetty’s interpre-
tative failure resides in her externalisation of  her own prejudgements. While Hackett fails to note 
the influence objects of  intrigue have upon his understanding of  them, Tetty does not acknowledge 
how her externalisation influences these objects.  
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The narrative shifts in the opening pages from an internal view of  Hackett’s relationship with the 
train station to Tetty’s externalised relation of  her “self ” to the same train station. The conversation 
that follows between the Nixons and Hackett is a farcical exchange which begins with the retelling 
of  their oldest child’s traumatic birth. Tetty introduces the retelling of  Larry’s birth after Hackett 
reads a lewd poem written by a murderous solicitor, a poem which Tetty endorses, after being subtly 
prompted to offer an interpretation which signals the shift away from Hackett’s interpretative obser-
vations towards Tetty’s, with a suitably ambiguous “[a]mple” (7). A pregnant lady then walks past 
the three and Tetty immediately turns to Goff  asking if  she ever looked like “that”(8). There are two 
important things to note about this event. Firstly, Tetty situates herself  in relation to a pregnant lady 
who happens to walk past through a rhetorical manoeuvre in which Goff  is responsible for singling 
Tetty out amongst pregnant women. The word “that” appears again in relation to a character in the 
novel (“that is Hackett”), again objectifying a character in the novel. It is also the second instance of  
deferral to Goff ’s perception of  someone within the narrative. Secondly, Tetty’s immediate reaction 
to the pregnant woman is to retell her own experience of  giving birth. Tetty exhibits a lack of  
hermeneutical awareness; she pays little attention to the narrative and word triggers that inform her 
responses (Kevorkian 431). She seems unaware that the story of  Larry’s birth comes to her at that 
moment due to the textual indicators that she is determined to appropriate rather than interrogate. 
The poem, described by Tetty as “ample”, is a rich weave of  sexual innuendo, corporeality, death 
and Joycean literary allusion. Thus it is no coincidental segue that leads to Tetty’s retelling of  what 
turns out to be a traumatic birth story. These textual indicators seem to serve no other purpose in 
the narrative other than to expose Tetty’s myopic interpretative procedure. As such, they stand as 
markers for the reader to note and once more interpretative focus is placed on Tetty’s inability to 
note these markers, rather than her bizarre birth story. 
The Nixons had been entertaining two of  Goff's friends when Tetty felt “Larry leap in her wom”(8). 
The spelling of  “womb” is another moment of  ecstasy in the text. Hackett at first does not under-
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stand what Tetty means by “wom”. This aurality suggests an ecstatic slippage between the text in its 
material form and the text as narrative world, a slippage that reveals the text’s awareness of  being 
read. Hackett questions Tetty’s use of  the word “wom” but the reader has no access to how this 
word was pronounced by Tetty. It is conceivable that she pronounced the word in the accepted fash-
ion, and, if  this is the case, then Hackett’s concern lies with the written word. Towards the end of  
the novel this slippage presents itself  again in a similar vein when the word “Bando”, a medication 
for erectile dysfunction, is said to be “spelt as pronounced” (145). Again this suggests a slip between 
the words on the page (the reader’s access to the text) and the self-consciousness of  the novel itself. 
The reader does not know how “Bando” is pronounced, but does know how it is spelt. In a novel 
that is interested in the aural similarity between “Watt” and the interrogative pronoun “what”, these 
instances offer a further ecstatic moment of  rupture and another example of  the text’s awareness of  
its reader. The introduction of  this aurality in Watt is juxtaposed with Tetty’s myopia in this dialogic 
exchange. I will return to the aurality of  Watt in the section dealing with Sam and Watt’s exchanges 
in part III. 
It takes Goff, a caricatured patriarchal figure, to explain that Tetty meant her “woom”. Tetty, ever 
observant of  social protocol, does not give any hint of  her leaping womb to the guests and this tact-
ful observance is interpreted by Hackett as a strange mixture of  guilt and shame, when Hackett 
says, “how embarrassing for you”(8). She proceeds to relate how her husband and his cronies were 
oblivious to the labour that was in full swing during dinner (8). Once Goff  and his friends retired to 
the billiard room, she dragged herself  upstairs on all fours and gave birth to Larry, cutting the um-
bilical cord with her teeth. It is not obvious whether Goff  knew his wife was pregnant or not and 
Tetty comes to his rescue by tactfully saying, “He thought I was coy” in response to Hackett’s en-
quiry (9). This ambiguous statement is meant as an inane quip to which Hackett observes the rules 
of  social protocol, “‘Haha,’ said Hackett” (9 my emphasis). 
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This entire story about a traumatic birth revolves around the severing of  the umbilical cord. Hack-
ett enquires into the sensation of  the removal. Initially Tetty asks him if  he asks after the mother or 
the child, to which Hackett responds that he was “not found under a cabbage”(9). Tetty tells him 
that it is always one of  great relief  and that she would have snapped the cord across her knee had 
she been forced to. Tetty’s insistence that she would have violently snapped the umbilical cord in 
order to fling her child into the world is reminiscent of  her own interpretative strategy: not wholly 
concerned about what she is “releasing”, but desperate to access the sensation of  “relief ”. 
This burlesque exchange between the Nixons and Hackett appears to foreshadow Watt’s forced re-
moval from a late night tram. The traumatic, violent birth story Tetty retells mimics Watt being 
thrown from the tram twenty metres before the station. Hackett and the Nixons are the textual loca-
tors for Watt’s arrival. This shift seems to transform the three characters on the bench into vulgar 
narrative devices, designed to interpret the arrival of  Watt, the titular character. However tempting 
it might be to interpret Tetty’s birth tale and Hackett’s apparently threatened masculinity in the face 
of  Goff ’s stereotypical patriarchal apathy to Tetty’s labour, I argue that this scene offers a glimpse 
into the interpretative practices of  Watt’s future interlocutors. A glimpse that requires the reader to 
perform an evaluation rather than an interpretation of  their re-presentations of  Watt. Hackett’s in-
terpretative strategy is mired by his desire to remain seated while he watches the merging of  the 
horizon “he had come out to see” (18). Hackett’s satisfaction with his evening takes shape when the 
“western sky was as the eastern, which was as the southern, which was as the northern” (18); wholly 
assimilated by the darkness of  night, the intrigue of  Watt’s arrival completely erased. 
These hyperbolic interlocutors that witness Watt’s arrival present the reader with a series of  inter-
pretations that are ultimately flawed. They are flawed because both Hackett and Tetty respectively 
fail to note the experience of  interpretation as a contributing factor in the understanding of  the 
world they inhabit. The narrative voice uses these characters to explore the inimical dangers of  as-
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similation. Hackett and Tetty desire to understand and move on. They both desire to understand as 
they are, unwilling to remain open to the questions and challenges that the interpretable object 
presents to their hermeneutical situations. This is a recurring event in Sam’s narrative which is 
borne out of  the unacknowledged bleeding which takes place between the object/subject distinc-
tion. These initial interlocutors are staging the “intrigue” Sam finds in his discussions with Watt in 
part III. This ecstatic self-relation exposes the multiple horizons at play in the text itself. These hori-
zons seem to resist the uniformity Hackett comes to the train station to see, and neither do they al-
low Tetty to play herself  out upon them without influence. These conversant gathered on a bench at 
a train station in fading light, witness Watt’s arrival: Watt is noted from the external first in the nar-
rative. In an anti-Cartesian move, Watt does not get to construct his own subjectivity through the 
rigours of  logic and method, but has an objectivity thrust upon him. This objectivity, expressed most 
explicitly in the mistaken identification of  Watt, colours the remaining text and bleeds into the rest 
of  the narrative; casting Watt as an oddity for investigation (similar to the Nackybal affair at the end 
of  part III) rather than a conventional narrative agent. This frustrates Sam’s attempts to understand 
Watt’s time at Knott’s house, because Sam requires Watt to act as interpreter. In the exchanges with 
Sam, the limitations imposed on Watt as interpretative agent in the narrative become more explicit-
ly linked to his construction as object.  
  
  2.2 
The third section of  Watt begins towards the end of  Watt’s stay at Mr Knott’s house. Watt’s narra-
tive of  life and its confusions at Knott’s house is disrupted by the newly located narrative voice, Sam. 
The narrator is ecstatically located within the text itself  and presents an interruption of  the narra-
tive events to regale the reader with a retelling of  how he came to know Watt’s story—how Watt was 
made. Part three details the exchanges that took place between Watt and Sam which provide Sam 
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with the information he needed to retell Watt’s tale. This section of  the novel extends the ecstatic 
understanding of  the text suggested above as characters in the text are not only responsible for in-
terpreting their actions in the world of  the novel, but appear to be responsible for the compilation of  
the text as a whole. Along with this meta-textual exploration of  the making of  Watt, the sequence 
continues to locate Watt as object for interpretation. Watt continues to draw Sam (as reader) up 
short and Sam continually fails to see that his construction of  Watt as object denies him access to 
Watt’s hermeneutical situation. This process confuses the linear development of  the narrative as well 
as the causality of  the text: it is never clear whether Watt’s failure to understand precedes his narra-
tive construction by Sam or is an effect of  this construction. I will argue for the latter, considering 
that any claims to the former would be impossible to verify and that Sam’s attempts to re-present 
Watt’s story ultimately elide the interpretative potential of  Watt within this construction. This elision 
is perhaps the central frustration for Sam with Watt, because he relies on Watt’s interpretative po-
tential, yet, in his attempts to express Watt’s story ultimately denies Watt the requisite subject-hood 
for interpretation. This section is paradigmatic of  the text’s attempts to capture the systematic dis-
tortions of  historical situations in hermeneutic discussion.  
The opening section of  part III revolves around boundaries, thresholds, mirrors and weather. Sam’s 
interactions with Watt are dependent on external factors. Sam and Watt would only meet and “con-
verse” when each was tempted by the weather, leaving their respective “mansions” to enjoy the gar-
den (129). The disruption in the narrative is attributed by Sam to the fact that he and Watt no 
longer share a garden to walk and occasionally talk in. The narrative resumes when Sam discovers a 
hole in a fence which allows him to regain access to Watt. Thus the narrative creates the impression 
that it is being constructed in “real time” as the disruption in Watt’s story of  Knott’s house is 
brought about because he is removed from the space he shared with Sam. This in turn creates space 
for Sam’s narrative surrounding the construction of  parts I and II. This creates the impression that 
the text is occupying multiple temporalities and in turn, that there are multiple “Watts”, and multi-
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ple historical horizons. Before I explore Watt’s failed interpretations, I wish to continue the explo-
ration of  his construction as interpretative object. By analysing the construction of  the narrative de-
scribing his time at Knott’s, this section explores, in an anticipatory manner, the failed hermeneutic 
of  Watt. 
The hole in the fence sequence is perhaps the paradigmatic moment of  ecstasy in the novel.  
I [Sam] thought I saw, in the fence, on my right, a hole, large and irregular. Judge then of  
my astonishment when, upon approach, I found I was not mistaken. It was a hole, in the 
fence, a large irregular hole, caused by numberless winds, numberless rains, or by a boar, or 
by a bull, flying, pursuing, a wild boar, a wild bull, blind with fear, blind with rage, or who 
knows perhaps with carnal desire, crashing at this point, through the fence, weakened by 
numberless winds, numberless rains. Through this hole I passed, without hurt, or damage to 
my pretty uniform, and found myself  looking around me, for I had not yet recovered my 
aplomb, in the couloir. My senses being now sharpened to ten or fifteen times their normal 
acuity, it was not long before I saw, in the other fence, another hole, in position opposite, 
and similar in shape, to that through which, some ten or fifteen minutes before, I had made 
my way.(136-137) 
This hole, of  unknown origin, opens an interstitial space for Sam and Watt. Where previously the 
fences had separated them, denying the continuation of  the narrative, this hole in the fence regains 
access to Watt for Sam and therefore the text. The separation has been absolved by fortune (be it a 
bull, boar or wind) and the gap has not been overcome, but penetrated. I read this as an idealised 
version of  Gadamer’s fusion of  horizons, albeit a simplified one. The holes in both fences creates a 
new space for the continuation of  the dialogue. However, this space is delimited by the fences on 
either side, something that is not readily understood by Sam. The interstitial space between the two 
fences is crucially constructed out of  the thresholds designed to “pen” in each character. It is in be-
tween each of  the character’s gardens that the narrator and his eponymous character can survey 
each other’s gardens and begin a burlesque waltz:  
I turned him round, until he faced me. Then I placed his hands, on my shoulders, his left 
hand on my right shoulder, and his right hand on my left shoulder. Then I placed my hands, 
on his shoulders, on his left shoulder my right hand, and on his right shoulder my left hand. 
Then I took a single pace forward, with my left leg, and he a single pace back with his right 
leg (he could scarcely do otherwise). (139) 
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The imagery of  Watt and Sam dancing shoulder to shoulder in a space between two fences is para-
digmatic of  the meta-textual elements in Watt. Sam takes control of  Watt and manipulates him into 
the movement that, in my limited understanding of  dance, mimics a waltz. Watt is forced to move 
his leg out of  the way because Sam thrusts his leg forward. We are told by Sam in the first part of  
the novel that Watt’s preferred mode of  travel was with his “back to his destination” (20).Watt is 
seen by Sam across the divide walking backwards and when Watt turns, to return the way he had 
come, Sam sees Watt’s garden as a mirror image of  his: 
(His resemblance, at that moment, to the Christ believed by Bosch, then hanging in 
Trafalgar Square, was so striking that I remarked it.) And at the same instant suddenly felt 
as though I were standing before a great mirror, in which my garden was reflected, and 
my fence, and I, and the very birds tossing in the wind, so that I looked at my hands, and 
felt my face, and glossy skull, with an anxiety as real as unfounded. (For if  anyone, at that 
time, could truly be said to resemble the Christ supposed by Bosch, then hanging in 
Trafalgar Square, I flatter myself  it was I.) (136) 
The passage resonates formally with the content. The parenthetical references to Hieronymous 
Bosch’s Christ shifts from “him” (Watt) to “I” (Sam) only after Sam “remarked it”. The parenthesis 
frames this description of  Watt. Sam’s linguistic desire to place Watt in relation to something exter-
nal shifts from a description of  Watt to a description of  himself. The self-consciousness of  the narra-
tive voice describing his remarking on this description reminds the reader of  the ecstatic-ness of  the 
text. Sam is self-consciously aware that by acknowledging his remark, rather than actually making it, 
the reader interacts with his text. The novel, once more, betrays an awareness that it is being read. In 
this instance the specular imagery distorts any understanding of  Watt into a portrayal of  Sam. 
Much of  Sam’s narrative construction rests on his inability to “represent” Watt, to capture his danc-
ing partner (marionette perhaps) as separate from himself. These failures manifest themselves 
throughout Watt, particularly in Watt’s inability to understand events as they happen. It seems that 
explanation is not only exorcism for Watt , but that by externalising his own “unfounded” anxiety, 10
Sam exerts a subjectivist interpretation onto Watt. 
 “For to explain had always been to exorcise for Watt” (64) I will be returning to this point in the next section of  the 10
chapter. It needed to be briefly introduced in relation to Sam, as I will link the construction of  Watt as character for 
Sam to Watt’s inability to “explain”. 
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The space in which the titular character and the fictionalised narrative voice perform their dance 
sacrifices its potential neutrality with Sam’s specular description. Even as the text is trying to capture 
the ecstasy of  being “beside itself ”, it cannot extricate itself  from its hermeneutic situation. In a sim-
ilar vein to the opening section of  the novel, Watt’s role as interpretable object, is made more pro-
nounced by his interlocutors’s desires to know about him, rather than hear him, or find themselves 
interrogated by him. 
When Watt spoke, he spoke in a low and rapid voice… Of  this impetuous murmur much fell 
in vain on my imperfect hearing and understanding, and much by the rushing wind was car-
ried away, and lost forever (133). 
Even in Sam’s description of  Watt’s voice, the failure to hear lies largely with Watt’s characterisa-
tion. His voice was low and rapid “lower voices, voices more rapid have been heard…than Watt’s…
But that there ever issued from the mouth of  a man…a voice at once so rapid and so low, is hard to 
believe.” (133) These aspects of  Sam’s narrative serve to involve the reader in a discussion around 
the compilation of  the text itself. Sam does not see Watt as subject, instead he tries to relate him to a 
prior representation. This fails and instead Sam reveals the extent of  his own failings as narrative 
voice for a text that seems to be constructed around the interstitial spaces that exist between gardens 
of  reference.  
When Sam translates Watt’s disintegrating language the reader is made aware of  the multiple gaps 
in the retelling of  Watt. Doubled with Sam’s failing hearing and Watt’s low, rapid voice, the distorted 
language in these sequences speaks to the unreliability of  Sam’s representation of  Watt’s story. 
Sam’s narrative does not attempt to cover these gaps however and instead he self-consciously makes 
the reader aware of  how the various lacunae came into being. I will quote these sections in full, be-
cause they portray an overt sense of  ecstasy and more particularly a historical inheritance in the 
language of  the text. Sam’s “translation” of  Watt’s language at this point betrays the encroaching 
influence of  the narrator within the story as a whole. Up until this section the narrative voice is tak-
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en as an observer rather than a constructive element in the text. The mediation of  Watt’s story is 
fairly total in that, whilst he is quoted verbatim, his language is changed and adjusted to meet the 
understanding of  Sam’s ear.  
Day of  most, night of  part, Knott with now. Now till up, little seen so oh, little heard so oh…
Thing quiet, dim. Ears, eyes, failing now also. Hush in, mist in, moved I so…But soon I grew 
used to these sounds and then I understood….Ot bro, lap rulb, krad klub, Ot murd, wol fup, 
wol fup. Ot niks, sorg sam, sorg sam. Ot lems, lats lems, lats lems. Ot gnut, trat stews, trat 
stews…But soon I grew used to these sounds and understood as well as before…Of  nought. 
To the source. To the teacher to the temple. To him I brought this emptied heart…But soon I 
grew used to these sounds, and then I understood as well as before…Deen did taw? Tonk. 
Tog da taw? Tonk…But soon I grew used to these sounds…Say he’d, No, waistcoat the, vest 
the, trousers the, socks the, shoes the, shirt the, drawers the, coat the, dress to ready things got 
had when…But soon I grew used to these sounds…Lit yad mac. ot og. Ton taw, ton tonk…
But in the end I understood…Dis yb dis, nem owt. Yad la, tin fo trap…But soon I grew used 
to these sounds, and then I understood as well as ever, that is to say fully one half  of  what 
won its way past my tympan. (140-144) 
The emphasis placed on Watt’s delivery and Sam’s ability to hear harkens back to the spelling and 
pronunciation of  “bando (spelt as it sounds)” and Tetty’s “wom/woom”, mentioned in part one of  
this chapter. The text toys with the idea of  aurality, betraying an awareness of  being read. Watt’s 
words take on a life in sound as well as in the private realm of  the mind’s voice. The words in this 
sequence carry little meaning in a linear reading, and Sam’s refrain, disrupting these garbled se-
quences, describe a growing “used to these sounds” before he understood. In a potentially self-de-
structive inversion, Sam seems to be elevating the spoken word over the written in his understanding 
of  Watt. The invitation to slip between “Watt” and “what”, “Knott”, “not” and “knot” is matched 
in a meta-textual sense by the relation of  “Hackett” to “Beckett”, and in the comparison between 
“Hackett” and “Watt”  made by Goff  in part I. The aurality of  Watt, the homophonically similar 11
interrogative pronoun and the proper noun attributed to Watt, challenge conventional linear narra-
tives. The text seems to spill off  of  the pages.   
 Early drafts of  Watt present Hackett as the character who Sam grapples with for understanding (See Marc Byron 11
“The Ecstasy of  Watt”. Samuel Beckett Today. Vol. 14. After Beckett (2004). Pp. 495-506.) 
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This glimpse into the construction of  the narrative becomes a further ecstatic moment when, later 
on in section three, the reader comes across a similarly deranged section of  text which appears to 
have a direct connection to these incomprehensible exchanges.  
As for his feet, sometimes he wore on each a sock, or on the one a sock and on the other a 
stocking, or a boot, or a shoe, or a slipper, or a sock and a boot, or a sock and a shoe, or a 
sock and a slipper, or a stocking and a boot, or a stocking and a shoe, or a stocking and a 
slipper…And sometimes he wore…And sometimes he wore…(173)  
  
This listing of  the possible combinations for what Mr Knott wore on his feet bears a striking resem-
blance to the garbled syntax which Sam “grew used to”. The scene is punctured by “[a]nd some-
times” which reminds the reader of  Sam’s involvement in the narrative construction as a whole. 
This scene physically disrupts the page of  the novel with its repetition and extended nature. It is a 
decidedly aural passage with the sliding sounds of  “sock/shoe/slipper/stocking” disrupted by 
“boot”. The text is thus referring to itself  and considering that some critics have misread Watt as a 
mute , the aurality of  the text becomes an important aspect of  a text that is never “simply 12
there” (Byron 495). 
In a sense this slip off  the page into aurality, mirrors the relationship between the spoken and the 
written word. The homophone of  “Watt/what” is the first instance of  the text drawing the reader 
up short, “what” is Watt? This question that seems to drive and obfuscate Sam’s narrative. The text 
is both on the page and off the page in its aural dimension. Watt’s activities in Sam’s narrative mirror 
Sam’s descriptions. Considering that Sam’s hands “often left his shoulders, to make a note in their 
little notebook”, this inversion of  the assigned causality of  Watt’s narrative creates further uncertain-
ty in Sam’s attempts to represent, rather than interpret. This in turn creates consternation surround-
ing the role of  the interpreter, and the impossibility of  understanding an object entirely as itself. For 
Gadamer an object can never be fully understood as itself because of  the constant renewal of  Tradi-
tion, carried forth perpetually through effective historical consciousness. The movement Sam and 
 John Mood makes this mistake in his 1971 article “‘The Personal System’— Samuel Beckett’s Watt”. PMLA, Vol. 86, 12
No. 2 (March, 1971). Pp, 255-265
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Watt make, whilst reminiscent of  a dance, is also a mirroring of  one another’s steps. The imagery of  
reflection is carried throughout the text’s multiple variations, repetitions and sequential descriptions 
of  Knott’s food, furniture, and dressing habits for example. In a physical manifestation of  
Gadamer’s hermeneutic horizons, the fence delimits the range of  Sam’s access to Watt. The hole in 
the fence, which for Gadamer would become the space in which the questions of  the text reach the 
reader, grants access to Watt for Sam. But he does not call Watt through, he crawls into the space 
and grasps Watt in dance. The fact that Sam sees these separate sections as mirrors rather than dif-
fering locales is an attempt to mitigate the distance between himself  and Watt. The distance is not 
present if  it is a reflection. Thus while Sam constructs Watt as an object for his observation he also 
fails to note his own thrown-ness, as he crawls into the void between the two fences. In the compari-
son to Bosch’s Christ, Sam appears to be suggesting that it would flatter him to be cast as the central 
character in the work of  art. It is not Watt that so intrigues him, but, in a moment of  dorsality rem-
iniscent of  Hackett, it is his own sense of  intrigue that he wishes to understand. This is a prejudge-
ment on Sam’s part, an attempt to assimilate Watt’s historical horizon (a horizon Watt navigates 
with his eyes facing backwards) into his own. 
Thus the reader is further removed from the interpretative action of  the novel. It appears that the 
text is a compilation of  Sam’s understandings of  Watt rather than an attempt to represent Watt’s 
story. While Sam’s failure to see Watt as subject denies Watt the potential to understand his own 
narrative, this section does provide Watt with a historicity. In a sense it explains the initial utterance 
of  the text, allocating itself  a historical horizon. This process is complicated by the fact that this 
hermeneutic situation is enclosed within the work itself. This presents a multiplicity of  horizons 
within a text which is constantly disrupting its own unity in the form of  sounds which escape the 
page, characters who seemingly become aware of  the limitations in their own characterisation and 
failed hermeneuticians betraying the inability to understand the effect they have within the world of  
the text.   
	 	 "59
The main contention with this objectification of  Watt expressed in the prejudgements of  Sam, is 
that the narrative preceding this waltz obsessively reconstructs Watt’s failures to understand. Sam 
expects Watt to perform interpretations of  his time in Knott’s employment, but does not grant him 
the requisite subjectivity to make these interpretative manoeuvres. The narrative seems to be driving 
Watt’s actions, rather than re-presenting his actions. Instead Sam would transcend the barrier be-
tween Watt’s experience of  Knott’s household, in order to re-create, rather than mediate, said expe-
rience. This is again an anticipatory Gadamerian manoeuvre in which the language of  the text, lan-
guage which belongs to Sam, structures Watt’s interaction with the world. The pervasiveness of  this 
structure delimits Watt’s potential as interpreter. In turn, this frustrates Sam’s desires to capture 
Watt’s understanding. This cyclical relation between representation in language as a tool which frus-
trates rather than exposes, is suggested in Beckett’s comments to George Duthuit:  
B. —The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing 
from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation 
to express. (103) 
This relationship to language as something which frustrates the very expression of  its own frustra-
tion pervades Watt, and gradually becomes pronounceable in the exasperation of  the titular charac-
ter with his own failing interpretative process. In the next section I will illustrate how Watt’s inter-
pretative failures betray a burgeoning awareness of  his construction as narrative object in a world 
created by Sam’s desire to understand. 
	 	  
	 	 2.3 
Considering that all of  Watt’s interlocutors cast him as an object to be understood, rather than an 
articulate subject to be experienced, it is little wonder that his world became “unspeakable” (Beckett 
71). Watt’s relationship to the unspeakable world of  Knott’s house is linked to his failure to under-
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stand. Watt, who “had not seen a symbol, nor executed an interpretation, since the age of  fourteen, 
or fifteen, and who had lived, miserably it is true, among face values all his adult life…” (60), begins 
to uncover the “fragility of  outer meaning” which causes him to “seek for another” (60). It becomes 
increasingly apparent that Watt is aware there is potentially more going on around him in Knott’s 
house than he has access to. It is these instances, where Watt seeks for another meaning that he finds 
the nominative descriptions of  objects in his world incomplete, and unsatisfactory. It becomes in-
creasingly difficult for him to separate the objects of  Knott’s household from a conception of  him-
self.  
The “unspeakable” aspects of  Watt’s world suggest his growing awareness that he is inextricably 
bound to a hermeneutical situation, a situation that has been thrust upon him by Sam. The break-
down in language’s relation to objects in Watt’s world renders them unspeakable. He cannot with 
any confidence attribute the word “pot” to the corresponding object in Knott’s kitchen (69). Yet, be-
ing a narrative construction created by language, his “desire for semantic succour” is very strong 
(68). But Watt is not the generative narrative voice of  his text and thus he relies on external voices, 
or authorities, to make his world. When, for example, Erskine does not consent to name the “pot” a 
“pot” it is not that his description would have transformed the “pot” into a “pot” for “Watt, for it 
would not” (69). Instead what Watt seems to desire from Erskine in his naming of  the objects in his 
world, is the confirmation that at the present instance Watt’s language has failed him, but that he 
will recover in the future. This futurity that Watt begins to rely on suggests his growing awareness 
that in Sam’s narrative he is a simulacrum of  himself. This is an ecstatic rupture in the text in which 
Watt himself  is beside himself. What this suggests is that Watt’s construction as interpretable object 
denies him a hermeneutical situation from which he can engage with his present locale. Instead, he 
needs an external voice, “wrapping up safe in words” the objects in the narrative, including himself: 
“it would have shown that at least for Erskine the pot was a pot, and Watt a man.” (69)    
	 	 "61
The infamous pot scene is matched by Watt’s discovery that the designation of  “man” to describe 
himself, is a historical inheritance that he is deeply suspicious of. These instances betray a burgeon-
ing self-awareness in his characterisation. His growing awareness that he is ill-equipped to describe 
and make sense of  the world, are directly attributable to the hermeneutic failures of  Hackett, the 
Nixons and Sam. By casting him as an object for interpretation Watt’s interlocutors and his scribe 
have removed both narrative agency and historicality from Watt. Considering that Sam wishes to 
understand what Watt understood about Knott’s household this objectification seems to be the crux 
of  the failure. But this failure does not necessitate an absence of  meaning. In fact what this failure 
represents is a critical portrayal of  methodologically devoted interpretation. Once Watt begins to 
look, seek for a meaning, the object under investigation changes and can no longer be described by 
the words and names Watt is familiar with—“For Watt now found himself  in the midst of  things 
which, if  they consented to be named, did so as it were with a reluctance.” (67) The fact that it is 
these “things” that resist Watt, rather than a failing on his part to understand them linguistically, 
speaks to Watt’s burgeoning awareness that the Tradition he has inherited through Sam’s narrative 
construction has an influence over the way he understands. It a structuring force that is external to 
his conceptions of  objects within his world.  
Dirk van Hulle notes that in Beckett’s 1965 Film, starring Buster Keaton, the effect is similar. 
O (‘object’) tries to avoid the looks of  E (‘eye’), who chases him everywhere. In the end, it 
turns out that all this time, Buster Keaton (who plays these roles) has been both running away 
from and chasing himself  [this representation …] enhanced the awareness that every text is 
both O[bject] and E[ye] at the same time, something which is embodied by a physical carrier 
(O) and which is inevitably transformed when it becomes a reception text (E), that is, when a 
reader sets eyes on it. (Van Hulle 284) 
Watt’s lack of  awareness that he is both “O” and “E” in this narrative is a direct result of  Sam’s 
construal of  Watt as solely “O”. Thus, Watt’s failed interpretative gestures become an indictment of  
Sam’s failed interpretation of  Watt. Sam’s narrative does not convey the fact that Watt was both an 
object and a subject influencing the narrative. As such, Sam’s interpretative attempts are criticised 
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for not only failing to understand, but failing to experience the interpretative process (a decidedly 
Gadamerian concept). While Watt is not as overtly, and absurdly, self-conscious as Buster Keaton’s 
scurrying, wall hugging tramp in Film, he is certainly beginning to understand why he will “never 
know” much about Knott’s house. This burgeoning awareness is an ecstatic rupture within the text. 
Watt’s seeking for meaning in the aftermath of  the Galls father and son piano tuning incident was 
not “so peculiar” that he sought after what the incident “really meant” but only sought what it 
“might be induced to mean, with the help of  a little patience, a little ingenuity.” (61) Watt is not 
seeking an essential “truth” in these instances, but rather an interpretation that makes sense to him 
within his current location. Again this is a Gadamerian concept of  understanding, that truth is not a 
finite position, immutable in its transference through history. Instead truth is the experience of  the 
work of  art, the truth that imparts itself  on the interpreter during the interpretative fusion of  hori-
zons. This is a crucial distinction for the criticisms that Habermas levels at Gadamer. Gadamer nev-
er claims that philosophical hermeneutics is complete. Instead, the position of  fusion is constantly 
rejuvenated and reassessed. The possibility for ideological critique, that Habermas claims is missing 
from Gadamer’s description, is readily available as each interpretation experiences the fusion of  
horizons in different locales, negotiating different versions of  Tradition through language. This 
meets the criteria for critique which often seeks to expose what was previously taken for granted. In 
Watt Sam, Hackett and Tetty take it for granted that Watt can be understood. There is a parody of  
the reader in this relationship. It is not that Watt cannot be understood, it is not that he “resists” 
nominative attribution, but rather that he can only be understood if  he is allowed to understand. 
This is the “what-ness” of  Watt that creates such interpretative intrigue in his interlocutors. But, in 
the Gadamerian framework, this requires a form of  subject-hood denied him by his interpreters and 
Sam. This denial of  Watt’s subjectivity through his construal as interpretable object, dramatises the 
tyranny of  hidden prejudgements that Gadamer describes in philosophical hermeneutics. This 
process emerges because of  Sam’s failure to acknowledge the multiplicity of  horizons and his assimi-
lation, rather than mediated interrogation, of  Watt’s historical horizon.   
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Watt’s interpretative ecstasy exposes the systematic distortion of  Watt’s interpreters. The text drama-
tises the effect of  prejudgement through the representation of  Watt’s failure to “know”. By exposing 
the interpretative prejudgements, assimilated and transferred onto and into Watt by Hackett, Tetty 
and Sam, the text encourages the reader to remain aware of  his/her own location as both “O and 
E”: affecting and changing meaning in the text and, in this case, being affected and changed by the 
text in each new interpretative moment. This allows an understanding of  Watt to emerge which ad-
dresses the second order hermeneutic questions of  the text. By engaging with the meta-hermeneutic 
concerns which constitute Watt, the reader is encouraged to interrogate his/her own interpretative 
process. Presented with a series of  bad hermeneuticians, the reader must cultivate a spectatorial po-
sition, in which s/he is responding to “what” is bad about these interpretative methods. It is this dis-
cussion around the failure of  understanding that leads many critics to disavow meaning in Watt, at-
tributing to it a “failurist” perspective in which the text grasps for “nothing” but finds itself  inca-
pable of  representing this “nothing”.  
The ecstatic-ness of  Watt is represented by Watt’s growing awareness that he is a finite textual entity, 
incapable of  interpreting the objects that surround him because he cannot interpret himself. Watt 
presents an absence, an aporia, in which the prejudgements of  his interlocutors create him for the 
reader. In these instances where the world of  objects that surround Watt begin to defy his nomina-
tive attribution that he seems to become aware of  this absence. 
For the only way one can speak of  nothing is to speak of  it as though it were something, just 
as the only way to speak of  God is to speak of  him as though he were a man, which to be 
sure he was, in a sense, for a time, and as the only way one can speak of  man, even our an-
thropologists have realised that, is to speak of  him as though he were a termite. (64) 
In this chapter I have shown how the multiple horizons in the text position the reader as a spectator, 
engaging with interpretations of  the text by the text, rather than mediating an interpretative en-
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gagement with a conventional narrative. This in turn exposes the prejudgements of  the characters 
in relation to Watt which affects his ability to understand the narrative world he has thrust upon him 
by Sam. I have argued that this is an anticipation and dramatisation of  Gadamer’s concerns with 
methodologically devout hermeneutic praxis, which seeks the same “semantic succour” Watt desires. 
The effect of  this on the reader is to create a heightened awareness of  the role hermeneutic situa-
tions play in interpretative exchanges. As such, the dramatisation of  systematic distortions, or the 
tyranny of  hidden prejudgements, becomes the site in which the reader is engaged in interpretative 
dialogue. Watt creates this relationship with the reader by disrupting habitual reading practices and 
linear narrative, creating a third space where the text exists beside itself.  It is in the relationship be-
tween the text and the reader that Watt becomes ecstatic and gestures towards the limitations of  rep-
resentation through the uninterrogated prejudgements of  language. By dramatising these limita-
tions, expressed through interpretation, the text anticipates Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutic 
description of  interpretation as Being, and Being that is understandable as language (Gadamer 
1960, xxxi). The only way that the text could conceivably represent “nothing” would be to gesture 
towards an absence: this absence is centred around Watt. His representation, through interpretation 
by Sam, is an exercise in failure because he has no Being that can be understood. The reader, locat-
ed in a spectatorial position, engages with the multiple historical horizons which create this absence 
of  Watt. The text is flush with meaning by exposing this dramatisation of  horizonal interaction, and 
the reasons for its failure. 
In the next chapter I will investigate Naked Lunch under the rubric of  philosophical hermeneutics. 
The chapter positions Naked Lunch on the opposite end of  the scale to Watt in its relationship with 
the reader. Burroughs’s text relies explicitly on the reader’s engagement, and, instead of  locating 
him/her in spectatorial relation to itself, it draws the reader into the world of  the novel, casting 
him/her as alternatively ally and enemy throughout the series of  routines which comprise the novel. 
The effect of  this on the reader’s hermeneutics is similar to the heightened awareness of  systematic 
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distortion present in representation that I have shown to be the case in Watt. Yet it is a radicalised 
version of  this awareness in that the text creates a powerful uncertainty and anxiety in the reader’s 
hermeneutic engagement. I will be working with the central thesis that Naked Lunch tries to con the 
reader into a submissive relation with its criticisms on authority, as a means to illustrate the pervasive 
power of  language’s relation to authority.    
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Chapter 3  
William S. Burroughs’s Naked Lunch: Interpretative Anxiety and Tradition. 
“Naked Lunch demands silence from the Reader. Otherwise he is taking his own pulse…” (187) This 
statement, made by Burroughs in the Atrophied Preface: Wouldn’t You? appended to the 2009 4th Estate 
“restored text” edition of  Naked Lunch, carries with it an uncomfortable didacticism. It is a demand 
made on the reader once s/he has reached the “end” of  the book; an interpretative insistence issued 
by an authorial presence in a text which is anxiously suspicious of  any authority at all. The text is 
littered with such paradoxical intrusions drawing the reader “up short” in his/her interpretative 
moment (Gadamer 280). The novel situates itself  as a cataclysmic criticism of  the mechanisms of  
control exposing the nefarious ways in which language is used to manipulate thought and experi-
ence. Yet the text also establishes itself  as the authority on such matters: “Naked Lunch is a blueprint, 
a How-To Book[…]How-To extend levels of  experience by opening the door at the end of  a long 
hall…” (187). Burroughs defines control as being intimately bound up in “suggestion” and “manipu-
lation” and, if  the control mechanism is extended to decimate any thoughts of  resistance, then con-
trol becomes unnecessary.  
I control a hypnotised subject (at least partially); I control a slave, a dog, a worker; but if  I estab-
lish complete control somehow, as by implanting electrodes in the brain, then my subject is little 
more than a tape recorder, a camera, a robot. You don’t control a tape recorder—you use it. 
(39) 
The ultimate form of  this manipulative coercive control is language, what Burroughs terms the 
“word virus”. For Burroughs “words are […] the principal instruments of  control” (39) and it is this 
suspicious relationship with language which creates the potential impasse of  Naked Lunch. 
Naked Lunch establishes itself  as a novel about the coercive intrusion of  language on experience. The 
text is continuously preoccupied with manipulation rather than domination. By establishing itself  as 
an authority on authority, Naked Lunch fosters an anxiety in the interpretative exchange between it-
self  and the reader. The reader is made aware of  the novel’s attempts to manipulate him/her 
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through the interpretative exchange and as such becomes suspicious in his/her engagement with the 
novel. Thus the text presents a dramatisation of  its own criticisms of  control through language as 
the reader is placed in a precariously anxious location within the back and forth of  the interpreta-
tive dialogue. I will argue that  this suspicion creates the potential for a response to the perceived 
impasse.  
The text’s antagonistic relationship with its own medium (language) exposes the interpellation of  
language and meaning within a Traditionary framework. This locating of  language and meaning 
overtly exposes the embedded ideology Habermas feared was overlooked in Gadamer’s philosophi-
cal hermeneutics. However, it is only by engaging dialogically with Naked Lunch that the embedded-
ness of  language comes to be pronounceable through a critically appraising, and self-reflective si-
lence. Gadamer’s anti-teleological description of  understanding through interpretative dialogue en-
courages the reader to remain open to the horizonal clashes between the text and his/her 
hermeneutic situation. Without the reader’s attempts to understand, the novel remains a proselytis-
ing document expounding the evils of  control. However when the reader opens him/herself  up to 
the questions of  the text, there is an anxiety which enters the dialogic exchange. This anxiety is 
borne out of  the growing suspicion that the text is trying to both “wise up” the reader, and con 
him/her into a position of  complicity with the novel’s criticisms of  control. This anxiety in the 
hermeneutic exchange does lead to the silence that Burroughs “demands” of  the reader. But it does 
not lead to silence because Burroughs demands it. It leads to silence because of  the dramatisation of  
control through language that the text effects through the interpretative engagement with the read-
er. As Oliver Harris notes, “Control and its terrors are present rather than represented in this writing, 
produced by as much as reproduced in it. We grasp these terrors by the experience of  being grasped 
by them” (54). 
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The dramatisation of  control through language relates to Habermas’s criticisms of  Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. If  language gives structure to and indelibly influences thought, and 
“being that can be understood is language” then the critique of  interpellation that Habermas accus-
es Gadamer’s historically inherited horizons of  succumbing to, seems to be an essential component 
of  the coercive effects of  control with which Burroughs is concerned (Gadamer xxxi). I will interro-
gate the relationship between these two aspects of  language, and suggest that Burroughs’s use of  
“The Word” is an attritional usage: his words “atrophy” and die out. The “death” of  these words 
leaves the reader in a critically appraising silence from which the potential for the interrogation of  
Tradition can begin.  
Importantly, Naked Lunch challenges distinctions of  textuality as well. The novel is encased in a series 
of  prefaces, introductions, essays, letters, and annexed routines. While these have been convention-
ally treated as fascicular documents in relation to the “main body of  the novel”, I find the distinc-
tion in relation to such an anarchic text tenuous at best. Most of  the material found in these “pe-
ripheral” texts correlates strongly with the material found in the novel itself. Harris claims that the 
introductions to the texts published in the 1950s have “upstaged” and “set the terms” for how they 
should be read (57). This betrays an interesting association of  authority with the “atrophied pref-
aces” of  Naked Lunch in particular. I would suggest that the critical focus on these fascicular docu-
ments is simply that the distinction between the “text itself ” and the accompanying introductions is 
not readily available. As such, I will be treating these documents as part of  the interpretative experi-
ence of  Naked Lunch and in possession of  as much “authority” as the routines traditionally considered 
to make up the novel.   
This chapter is broken into three distinct sections.  Writing  about a text as fractious as Naked Lunch is 
a difficult proposition and I wish to avoid, as much as is possible, imposing a structure onto a text 
that overtly defies structures. It must be stated from the outset that Naked Lunch is not a novel that 
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“begins” and “ends” in any conventional sense: it does not lead the reader to a conclusion through a 
series of  propositions and fictional premises. Instead the text explodes on the page and requires the 
reader to balance the multiple routines as individual segments as well as snapshots coalescing to 
form a vista of  a paranoid, antagonistic world. In the first section I will discuss the context from 
which Naked Lunch emerges and discuss the potential dangers in ascribing historical allegory to the 
novel. I will discuss the multiple, deferring historical horizons that Naked Lunch represents in its mosa-
ic structure in relation to a critique of  allegorical readings of  Naked Lunch and the Cold War. This 
section will also discuss Burroughs’s views on censorship and thought control. The discussion 
around censorship will allow me to segue into Burroughs’s theory of  language. In both of  these sec-
tions I will be relying heavily on Naked Lunch to explain, complicate and affirm aspects of  anxious 
hermeneutics. In the final section of  the chapter I will perform a forensic reading on the opening 
section of  the book. In the concluding section I will discuss how anxiety informs the interpretative 
self-doubt that allows Naked Lunch to dramatise its critiques of  language in the interpretative ex-
change. This silence, borne from an anxiety fostered in the interpretative exchange, encourages a 
self-reflective awareness on the part of  the reader. S/he is constantly aware that they are reading. Anx-
iety in this sense, becomes a positive, productive interpretative tool for the reader of  Naked Lunch, but 
it is only available through a Gadamerian interrogation of  Tradition, hermeneutic situations and 
historical horizons. As with the chapter on Watt, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics will inform 
all my critical engagement with Naked Lunch and I will show how Burroughs’s desire for silence on 
the part of  the reader, becomes a critically valuable response to the critiques of  interpellation in 
philosophical hermeneutics.  
3.1 
Them Communists they wus comin' around, 
They wus in the air, 
They wus on the ground, 
They wouldn't gimme no peace . . . 
(Bob Dylan, Talkin’ John Birch Society (Paranoid) Blues) 
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Bob Dylan was invited to perform on the Ed Sullivan Show in March 1963. Dylan wanted to per-
form his parodic talking blues of  the John Birch Society but was told that the song was too risqué for 
the show. Dylan refused to perform and walked off  the set (Willentz 92-93). The song details the 
paranoid ramblings of  a new John Birch Society recruit as he begins to uncover Communists all 
around him in suburban America. The irony of  censoring this song was of  course that there was an 
Aesopian truth to the absurd representation of  looking for Communists in a “T.V. set”—at least for 
the censors at the Ed Sullivan Show, the fear was that television viewers would “find them”. “Well, I 
was sittin' home alone an' started to sweat, Figured they wus in my T.V set. Peeked behind the pic-
ture frame, Got a shock from my feet, hittin' right up in the brain. Them Reds caused it!” (Dylan) 
William S. Burroughs’s second novel Naked Lunch, was also the subject of  censorship between 1959 
and 1966. In a landmark appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Naked Lunch was cleared of  
obscenity charges. The clearing of  all charges against Naked Lunch was to be the “last instance of  
complete literary censorship in the US” (Whiting 145). The fact remains that this process took seven 
years. In a great feat of  bureaucratic irony, the courts affirmed Burroughs’s “word hoard” (NL, 188) 
to be in possession of  a literary and representative authority that Naked Lunch avidly critiques and 
defers. It also suggests that whilst Dylan’s Talkin’ John Birch Society (Paranoid) Blues was provocative 
enough to be considered coercive, Naked Lunch offered enough societal comment to warrant a legal 
stamp of  approval. In both Dylan’s and Burroughs’s cases the censorship of  their creative works 
adds a materiality to what they were both attempting to capture through phantasmagoric farce.  
Although prosperous, post-war America was a country enmeshed in Cold War anxieties. Having 
emerged from the Second World War relatively unscathed (the majority of  the fighting and destruc-
tion being limited to Europe), with war time savings amounting to 140 billion dollars, and an en-
trenched position of  global prominence, America of  the 1950s was an economically viable nation 
(Fried, 78-79). American citizens purchased an average of  twenty-thousand television sets daily in 
the mid-fifties, automobiles rolled off  of  the factory floors and an intricate weave of  highways shut-
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tled men in grey suits to work and back (Fried, 78-79). But as materially buoyant as the era may 
have been it was by no means peaceful.   
It was in this climate that the Truman regime came under fire from Republican senators, employing 
the public’s fears to gain political purchase in their frustrations at being repeatedly denied office, for 
“selling out to Communism” (Fried, 81). Senator Joseph R. McCarthy came to the fore as the lead-
ing voice in what rapidly devolved into a witch hunt. McCarthy and HUAC came to dominate polit-
ical discourse of  the period and elaborated upon speculations of  an intricate network of  Soviet spies 
desperate to steal American atomic secrets and the like. However, it would be truly reductive to sug-
gest that McCarthyism was solely a consequence of  Senator McCarthy and other Republican sena-
tors’s politicking. Instead, anti-Communist rhetoric and fears were buttressed  by a commitment to a 
shared “American way of  life”, which was becoming increasingly contained and claustrophobic 
throughout the decade. As Richard M. Fried notes,  
[m]any Americans were bewildered by the deep social and political changes at work in the 
twentieth century. Many such changes occurring in the neighbourhood, the nation, and the 
world could, consistent with America's anti-Communist consensus, be attributed to Commu-
nist scheming. Thus a profound cultural aversion to communism also underlay McCarthyism. 
It was this detestation that gave politicians broad leeway to pursue anti-Communist endeav-
ours. A related factor was the nation's underdeveloped appreciation of  the importance of  
civil liberties for repudiated minorities (84). 
This commitment to a shared ideology encouraged an uncritical climate, in which universities were 
discouraged from prescribing works by Marx and intellectuals were afraid to posit their political 
viewpoints. This “cultural aversion to Communism” is also captured by the Bob Dylan song. By us-
ing a talking blues to satirise the paranoid detection of  Communist affiliation from spaces as inti-
mate as the toilet bowl to objects as ubiquitous as the American flag, the song suggests the universal 
or totalising nature of  this fear. This is ultimately a form of  tautological reasoning; Communism is 
everywhere because everywhere there is Communism. 
The totalisation of  a “way of  life” left an indelible mark on the ways texts were censored during the 
period. Due to the encroaching fears of  Communism, censorship was not left to the governmental 
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agencies alone but had proliferated amongst a populace determined to remain loyal to an economic 
prosperity which was uncritically related to the successful ideological underpinnings of  Capitalism. 
As Stuart Ewan notes in his study of  advertising and its role in the emergent consumer culture of  
the era, 
[c]onsumerist ideology became rampant, critical social thought became anathema…The 
Consumerised universe was…erected with unprecedented vigour, positing an economic na-
tionalism which signified the inviolate sanctity of  the world of  goods. The definitions of  
“freedom” and “choice” were being unified and firmly implanted in the conception of  loyal 
commitment to the political, religious and social arenas [of] brand names and consumer 
credit…[T]he definition proffered by a “freedom-loving” political ideology was one in which 
to produce one’s own world was subversive (except where it was legitimised by the “do-it-
yourself ” industry); to assert the idea that a community might control its own destiny was 
“communistic.”…[T]o look different; to act different; to think different; these became the 
vague archetypes of  subversion and godlessness. …The vision of  freedom which was being 
offered to Americans was one which continually relegated people to consumption, passivity, 
and spectatorship. …While heralding a world of  unprecedented freedom and opportunity, 
corporations (in concert with the state apparatus) were generating a mode of  existence which 
was increasingly regimented and authoritarian (105). 
As much as the American public was victimised by the anti-Communist propaganda and Commu-
nist witch hunt initiated by Senator McCarthy’s “Red Scare”, the reality was an intricate dialectical 
relationship between the public sphere and the so-called private sphere. In Dylan’s Talkin’ John Birch 
(Paranoid) Blues, the narrator concerns himself  with finding Communists secreted in physically inti-
mate spaces, such as his toilet bowl and his chimney, as well as the metaphorically intimate space of  
his selfhood when  he “couldn’t imagine doing anything else/So now I’m sittin’ at home, investi-
gatin’ myself.” In these instances the threat of  global Communism has moved irrevocably from the 
international political sphere into the toilet bowls and psyche of  the individual. Despite the histrion-
ic sentiment behind Dylan’s representation, there is a sense in which this representation was accu-
rate for many.  
The collapse of  previously held distinctions between the private and public spheres in the name of  
public “safety” and “health”, is forcefully illustrated in Burroughs’s Naked Lunch in the baroque rou-
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tine entitled “Meeting of  International Conference of  Technological Psychiatry.” Here a doctor 
presents his monstrous version of  a de-anxietised creature,  
“Gentlemen, the human nervous system can be reduced to a compact and abbreviated spinal 
column. The brain, front, middle and rear must follow the adenoid, the wisdom tooth, the 
appendix…I give you my Master Work: The Complete All American Deanxietised 
Man…” (87)  
In this section “Doctor ‘Fingers’ Schaefer, the Lobotomy Kid’s[…] Master work: The Complete All 
American Deanxietised Man” (87) is presented to the “Gentleman” of  the international delegation 
of  technological psychiatrists. The creature arrives in the room as a man but rapidly transforms into 
a black centipede after shedding its human flesh. The “deanxietised man” in this routine appears to 
be a scientific anomaly which sheds its human form. The audience members mutter about Schae-
fer’s irresponsibility and failings as a man of  science, but most damningly “a fat frog-faced Southern 
Doctor who has been drinking corn out of  mason jar” (88) yells out that they “must stomp out the 
Un-American crittah.” (88.) The invocation here, in conjunction with Stuart’s assertion that free-
dom for American citizens had “relegated people to [a position of] consumption, passivity, and spec-
tatorship”, is that the deanxietised man is “Un-American”. The fact that this mutated form, from 
man to insect, is un-American in the Southern Doctor’s diagnosis suggests that the notion of  hu-
manity is intimately linked to the moniker: American. Also, the fact that this creature only trans-
forms once it has been “de-anxietised” suggests that there is both a humanity in anxiety and that 
this anxiety is a condition of  being an American. Stuart’s suggestion is that the relegation of  citizens 
to the positions espoused above denies a sense of  humanity and individuality to the increasingly 
homogenised “consumer”. 
The “consumer” is thus placed in parallel with the metamorphosing “All American Deanxietised 
Man”. There is something human in anxiety as opposed to the constant references to the dehuman-
ised position of  an insect; a position reinforced in the rhetoric of  the McCarthy era. Fiona Patton 
notes in her study of Naked Lunch as a gothic novel emerging from the “gothic fifties”, that the 
rhetoric of  “otherness” which dominated the anti-Communist and un-American sentiment was 
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largely achieved through metaphorical allusions to disease and monsters. McCarthy’s descriptions of  
Communism often took the form of  allusions to “octopi, snakes, and spiders” (Patton, 54). It was 
simpler to construct “The Communist” (definite article necessary) as a monstrous entity, or a “ma-
lignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue” in order to cultivate both the sense of  pervasive 
fear as well as a dependence on authority for protection from what was feared (Kennan qtd in Pat-
ton, 54). Thus the Cold War and McCarthy’s “Red Scare” saw the collapse between spaces of  inter-
action, which was achieved through the reinforcement of  fast binary distinctions between “Self/
Human” (American) and “Other” (Communist). These fast binary distinctions were established 
through the manipulation of  metaphorical language. By casting Communism as a monstrous dis-
ease it became much easier to deny “communists” a sense of  shared humanity. This allocation of  
humanity away from Communism is also prominent in the proliferation of  articles on brainwashing 
emerging in popular culture at the time.  It was inconceivable that human beings would willingly 13
subjugate themselves to a system associated metaphorically with disease and monstrousness. 
At the end of  his technological psychiatric conference routine, Doctor Schaefer is tried by the DA 
(District Attorney) and the existence of  his “All American Deanxietised Man” is questioned because 
it had been incinerated by the attendees. Importantly the “All American” must be constructed, culti-
vated in a lab and once it has reached this totalising state, it cannot support its human form. 
Secondly, the destruction of  the black centipede is what the DA is investigating in the routine, not 
whether Schaefer should have created it:  
Gentleman of  the jury, these “learned gentlemen” claim that the innocent human creature 
they have so wantonly slain suddenly turned itself  into a huge black centipede and it was 
“their duty to the human race” to destroy this monster before it could, by any means at its 
disposal, perpetrate its kind. (88) 
 Unlike McCarthyism, which by the mid-fifties had come to operate in an increasingly marginalised space 13
in American culture, “brainwashing”, by the mid-sixties, “had been the subject of more than two hundred 
articles in popular U.S. magazines” Melley, Timothy. “Brainwashed! Conspiracy Theory and Ideology in the 
Postwar United States” New German Critique, No. 103 Dark Powers: Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory 
in History and Literature (Winter, 2008), pp. 145-164. p, 148. 
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The language of  the official authority, the DA, ironises the positions espoused by those in charge 
during McCarthy’s witch hunt. The contentious words “duty”, “human race”, and “creature”, all 
serve to reify the rhetoric of  good/evil, healthy/diseased, human/insect (monster) which litter the 
rhetoric of  the Cold War. J. Edgar Hoover wrote that the Communist Party “seemed little more 
than a freak [in the beginning]. Yet in the intervening years that freak has grown into a powerful 
monster endangering us all.”(Hoover qtd in Patton, 53) In the infamous “Long Telegram” sent from 
Moscow in 1946, George Kennan had this to say regarding Communist-American polarity: “Much 
depends on the health and vigour of  our own society. World Communism is like a malignant para-
site which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is the point at which domestic and foreign policies 
meet.” (54 in Patton) Kennan’s telegram positions both the binary of  public and private spheres of  
influence in relation to anti-Communist sentiment as well as the binary of  healthy and diseased. In 
the rationale of  the “Long Telegram” a healthy society had no need for Communism because 
Communism had no need for a healthy society. When Burroughs’s Deanxietised Man turns into a 
black centipede he is collapsing one of  the key binaries in this historical context—that of  human 
being (American/Capitalist) and that of  illegitimate, monstrous creature (Communist). 
In many respects Burroughs’s novel parodies, in its form, the acquiescence of  allegory to the dictates 
of  censors deciding what can be presented to a reader when. In Naked Lunch the text attempts to 
present the reader with the “naked” reality, an attempt to illustrate “the frozen moment when 
everyone sees what is on the end of  every fork” (NL, 199). But to attribute an allegorical reading to 
the text, one that ties it directly to the concerns surrounding the rhetoric of  the Cold War is to min-
imise the broader claims of  Burroughs’s work. Naked Lunch is a series of  routines, placed in no par-
ticular order, asking the reader to participate in the juxtaposition of  said routines—“I do not pre-
sume to impose ‘story’ ‘plot’ ‘continuity’…I am not an entertainer…” (NL, 184). Burroughs asks the 
reader to negotiate each routine on its own terms, whilst maintaining a conception of  the effect of  
the whole of  the text. Because each section could be read as a stand alone piece a multiplicity of  
historical horizons and hermeneutic situations are presented to the reader. As such to ascribe a sole 
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context which then explicates any understanding of  Naked Lunch as a “Cold War novel” is to avoid 
the collision of  these horizons and the effect they perpetuate in the interpretative dialogue. Bur-
roughs’s conception of  language is central in this respect. He distrusts the medium entirely, and 
works within a framework of  hard linguistic determinism. This conception of  language is manifest-
ed throughout his oeuvre and particularly in his views on censorship. Thus the historical context of  
the Cold War seems to offer much in understanding Burroughs’s preoccupation with language as 
coercive creator of  false realities but such readings offer Burroughs’s works up as an exemplar of  the 
period, exposing that Cold War rhetoric was employed rather than discussing the effects of  this con-
ception of  language in the interpretative instance. I think Burroughs’s ambitions were more lofty 
and that Naked Lunch, by showing the reader how s/he can be manipulated and coerced during the 
interpretative process, encourages a critical awareness of  language within a Traditionary horizon. 
For Gadamer’s conception of  dialogue as interpretation this meta-hermeneutic engagement re-
sponds to the claim that philosophical hermeneutics remains unaware of  the location of  language 
within an ideological Tradition. This is fostered through a mildly paranoid relationship between the 
text and the reader.  
	 	 3.2 
In 1962 Burroughs was invited to present a talk on censorship at the Edinburgh Writer’s Confer-
ence. His speech suggested that censorship was a form of  mind control and, despite its somewhat 
polemical position, coheres with his thoughts surrounding language more generally:  
Censorship is the presumed right of  governmental agencies to decide what words and images 
the citizen is permitted to see: that is thought control since thought consists largely of  word 
and image — What is considered harmful and therefore censored will of  course depend on 
the government exercising censorship — in The Middle Ages, when the church controlled 
censoring agencies, the emphasis was on heretical doctrines — In Communist countries cen-
sorship is close in the area of  politics — In English-speaking countries the weight of  censor-
ship falls on sexual word and image as dangerous to an economic system depending on mass 
production and a large public of  more or less uncritical consumers — In any form censor-
ship presupposes the right of  the government to decide what people will think — I am pre-
cisely suggesting that the right to exercise such control is called into question. (Burroughs, 5) 
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Burroughs’s conception that thought “consists largely of  word and image” and that these are the 
zones in which censorship is felt most acutely, allows him to suggest that censorship is a version of  
thought control. This theoretical conception of  thought as language is a hard form of  linguistic de-
terminism and ascribes a level of  authority to the written word that Burroughs’s oeuvre seeks to dis-
rupt. If  patterns of  meaning and understanding can be mapped out in relation to language and im-
ages, and certain combinations deemed unsavoury, then for Burroughs language can be controlled. 
In Burroughs’s estimation “control can never be a means to any practical end...it can never be a 
means to anything but more control…”(NL, 135) which entails that control is never “complete” and 
will remain “impartial” (a key component in his distinction between control and utilisation). The 
anti-teleological momentum of  control for Burroughs is intimately bound up in his somewhat de-
terministic conception of  language as the site in which free thought is denied.  
The author’s paranoia surrounding language as suppressant of  free thought can never be accurately 
described because this description would depend on language. It is this exact tension which perme-
ates and colours the reader’s interpretative engagement with Naked Lunch. However there are in-
stances where Burroughs seems to suggest that language can escape the control of  the writer: 
The writer sees himself  reading to the mirror as always…He must check now and again to 
reassure himself  that The Crime of  Separate Action has not, is not, cannot occur…Anyone 
who has ever looked into a mirror knows what this crime is and what it means in terms of  
lost control when the reflection no longer obeys…Too late to dial P o l i c e… (NL, 186).       
The temporal shift in the second sentence claiming that “The Crime of  Separate Action has not, is 
not, cannot occur” implies that language is escaping from the writer, his reflection is shifting through 
a series of  temporal locales, both past, present and even into the future. Language, as it exists in 
Naked Lunch “spill[s] off  the page in all directions”, deferring the temporal locale of  the Crime of  
Separate Action so that it is never clear whether it “has” happened, “will” happen, or is “happen-
ing” (NL, 191). But Burroughs conceives of  language in even harder terms than these. For him lan-
guage is a virus.  
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The Word is literally a virus, and it has not been recognised as such because it has achieved a 
state of  relatively stable symbiosis with its human host; that is to say The Word Virus (the 
Other Half) has established itself  so firmly as an accepted part of  the human organism that it 
can now sneer at gangster viruses like smallpox, and turn them in to the Pasteur Institute. But 
The Word clearly bears the single identifying feature of  the virus: it is an organism with no 
internal function other than to replicate itself. (“Ten Years and a Billion Dollars”, Burroughs, 
47) 
The perpetual replication of  The Word Virus is intimately bound up with Burroughs’s conception 
of  control as never being fully manifested. In this rendering The Word becomes material, occupying 
both time and space. This materiality of  The Word as Virus, allows Burroughs to explore mechanis-
tic responses to language, whilst avoiding the inferential and representational consequences of  such 
a rendering of  meaning. 
Burroughs has three explicit concerns regarding language: the definite article, the concept of  either/
or, and the “is” of  identity. Burroughs’s contention with the definite article “the” is that it is totalis-
ing and his solution is to replace “the” with “a”. Burroughs’s solution to the distinguishing quality 
imbedded in the concept of  either/or is to replace it entirely with “and”. Finally Burroughs con-
tends that the “is” of  identity, which, in his formulation, stultifies and suggests finality, should be 
abandoned altogether (Electronic Revolution, 32-36). 
The mechanistic overhaul of  language and basic grammatical codes are indicative of  Burroughs’s 
attempts to work from within a system to dismantle its apparatus. His concern with these basics of  
grammar is not to reduce language to a more abstract representational mode but to expose the rou-
tines, and potentially determined nature of  linear discourse. By dismantling some of  the stricter de-
finitive claims made by language (the either/or distinction, the “is” of  identity and the finality ac-
corded to “the”) Burroughs lessens its control, “Burroughs’s strategy of  resistance is always to turn 
the enemy’s weapons against themselves” (Lydenberg, 43).  
Burroughs’s attempts to materialise The Word in order to repair and expose its habitual modes of  
understanding manifest themselves in Naked Lunch’s narrative tics. In Naked Lunch Burroughs employs 
a litany of  narrative techniques to challenge conventional modes of  understanding through lan-
guage. Parataxis is the most evident technique employed by the narrative. By allowing the descrip-
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tions of  people and places to run into each other through an asyndetic syntax, the reader is denied 
the comfort of  coordinating conjunctions and required to work harder to create a unified image 
from a series of  fragments. 
Chicago: invisible hierarchy of  decorticated wops, smell of  atrophied gangsters, earthbound 
ghost hits you at North and Halsted, Cicero, Lincoln Park, panhandler of  dreams, past in-
vading the present, rancid magic of  slot machines and roadhouses[…]And always cops: 
smooth college-trained state cops, practiced, apologetic patter, electronic eyes weigh your car 
and luggage, clothes and face; snarling big city dicks, soft-spoken country sheriffs with some-
thing black and menacing in old eyes colour of  a faded grey flannel shirt… (NL, 11) 
The descriptions work from the general to the specific, from a pejorative slur (“wops”) describing 
European migrants to the US, to a country sheriff  whose eyes hold “something black and menac-
ing”. The reader is asked to work these colliding images into a complete mosaic of  “Chicago” (11). 
This technique is overtly hermeneutic and requires interpretative effort on the part of  the reader to 
find a point of  cohesion in the litany of  adjectives.   
The text also employs malapropisms, misquotes, misspellings and typographical errors to explore 
the inaccuracy of  language in conveying meaning: “A battalion of  rampant bores [boars] prowls the 
streets” (33). A rampant bore, as opposed to the more conventional “rampant boar” exposes the 
slipperiness of  the word and the potential violence of  a “bore”. The malapropism has the added 
effect of  disrupting, and surprising the reader evoking an irony in the use of  the word “bore”. It also 
slips into the meaning of  creating a hole, “boring into…” which relates to what Burroughs thinks 
the role of  a poet is: “all poets worthy of  the name are mind parasites, and their words ought to get 
into your head and live there, repeating and repeating and repeating” (Qtd in Harris, 2003, 6). The 
notion of  repetition is important for “bore” because the hole created is generally made by a cylin-
drical tool. 
Burroughs also puts his own spin on a quote from Macbeth “Confusion hath fuck his 
masterpiece” (35). A famous adage from Nathan Bedford Forest, a confederate general during the 
civil war receives similar treatment in, “He really got there firstest with the mostest” (50) and there is 
also the insertion of  expletives in common idioms, “that citizen wouldn’t give up the shit, I mean the 
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ship.” (53), “We should look a gift horse in the ass already?” (133) These examples show the slippage 
that the word is capable of  and the impossibility of  assigning The Word a single meaning. These 
techniques are expository and seek to disrupt the habitual modes of  understanding in the reading 
process.  
Language as virus takes on a visceral form in the infamous “carny man” routine. The routine is re-
lated by Dr Benway and he prefaces the routine with a description of  the audience reception of  the 
“carny man’s” act: 
Benway: Why not one all purpose blob? Did I ever tell you about the man who taught his 
asshole to talk? His whole abdomen would move up and down you dig farting out the words. 
It was unlike anything I ever heard. This ass talk had a sort of  gut frequency. It hit you right 
down there like you gotta go. You know when the old colon gives you the elbow and it feels 
sorta cold inside, and you know all you have to do is turn loose? Well this talking hit you right 
down there, a bubbly, thick stagnant sound, a sound you could smell. (110-111) 
A preface, detailing the effect of  the asshole’s speech on the audience, reminds the reader of  the en-
compassing effect of  The Word. The language of  the asshole is presented as something that is not 
simply heard, but smelt and felt in the colon (apt for this routine). This description of  the language 
of  the “asshole” lends a sensory physicality to the routine. 
Benway goes on to describe how the asshole grew to take over the rest of  the body: 
“This man worked for a carnival you dig, and to start with it was like a novelty ventriloquist 
act. Real funny, too, at first… After a while the ass started talking on its own. He would go in 
without anything prepared and his ass would ad-lib and toss the gags back at him every time. 
Then it developed sort of  teeth-like little raspy incurving hooks and started eating. He 
thought this was cute at first and built an act around it, but the asshole would eat its way 
through his pants and start talking on the street, shouting out it wanted equal rights. It would 
get drunk, too, and have crying jags nobody loved it and it wanted to be kissed same as any 
other mouth. Finally it talked all the time day and night, you could hear him from blocks 
screaming at it to shut up, and beating it with his fist, and sticking candles up it, but nothing 
did any good and the asshole said to him: ‘It’s you who will shut up in the end. Not me. Be-
cause we don’t need you around here any more. I can talk and eat and shit.’ After that he 
began waking up in the morning with a transparent jell like a tadpole’s tail all over his 
mouth. This jelly was what the scientists called un-D.T., Undifferentiated Tissue, which can 
grow into any kind of  flesh on the human body. He would tear it off  his mouth and the 
pieces would stick to his hands like burning gasoline jelly and grow there, grow anywhere on 
him a glob of  it fell. So finally his mouth sealed over, and the whole head would have ampu-
tated spontaneous…except for the eyes, you dig. That’s the one thing the asshole couldn’t  do 
was see. It needed the eyes. But nerve connections were blocked and infiltrated and atrophied 
so the brain couldn’t give orders any more. It was trapped in the skull, sealed off. For a while 
you could see the silent, helpless suffering of  the brain behind the eyes, then finally the brain 
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must have died, because the eyes went out, and there was no more feeling in them than a 
crab’s eye on the end of  a stalk.” (111-112)  
The performer is consumed by the performance in this routine and the “carny man” ceases to exist 
as a separate entity from his act. But the consumption of  the man is built around the wrestling for 
control of  language. The other bodily functions (barring sight) are not needed by the asshole; once it 
has control of  language, it controls the carny man. Ultimately his loss of  control is brought about 
because he fails to listen to a frustrated “asshole” who desires to be understood. Gadamer states that, 
“Being that can be understood is language” and in this routine the language acquisition of  the “ass-
hole” constructs a subject-hood which disavows the “asshole’s” previously purely ontic existence; the 
“asshole’s” growing ability to be understood grants it an ontology (Gadamer 1960, xxxi).  
The competition for control of  language in the “Carny Man” routine exposes that there is no inno-
cent performance in Naked Lunch (Lydenberg, 40). There is a combative air to the interpretative dia-
logue in which the reader is embroiled when reading Naked Lunch. Burroughs’s theory of  language 
and his overt concerns with the biological create the experience of  being subsumed, or enveloped by 
the text. In the case of  the “carny man” his secession of  language to his “asshole” destroys and re-
places him. This eradication is intimately bound up in Burroughs’s biological construction of  lan-
guage.  
In a similar vein to that of  the “carny man” the reader finds him/herself  in a resistant dialogical 
relationship with Naked Lunch, rather than the earnest description of  dialogue proffered by Gadamer. 
The text makes use of  the term “agent” repeatedly. The term refers to the world of  subterfuge and 
covert representational police action, but it also has strong biological connotations. The role of  the 
agent in Naked Lunch is particularly convoluted because it appears that almost every character is 
working for someone, or has some party affiliation. There are four distinct “parties” in Interzone, 
the fictional city scape where a bulk of  Naked Lunch takes place. These parties are: the Liquefaction-
ists whose “program involves the eventual merging of  every man into One Man by protoplasmic 
absorption” (123). The Divisionists who,  
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literally divide. They cut off  tiny bits of  their flesh and grow exact replicas of  themselves in 
embryo jelly. It seems probable, unless the process of  division is halted, that eventually there 
will be only one replica of  one sex on the planet: that is, one person in the world with mil-
lions of  separate bodies. (137) 
There are the “Senders” who can never receive messages but have to constantly send all the time 
(137). The “Senders” appear to be the most feared party in Interzone because they betray a myopic 
lack of  empathy and never attempt to understand anything beyond their own sending. Agent Lee 
informs the reader that he is a member of  the “Factualist” party who are in direct opposition to the 
other three parties of  Interzone, and work to keep a balance amongst the desires for domination 
expressed by the other three parties. The “Factualists” are opposed to the telepathic tools of  the 
“Senders” because “Senders” use these communicative abilities to “control, coerce, debase, exploit 
or annihilate” the individual (140). However, it is never clear what the Factualist party aims for. 
There is no express ideology they represent apart from resisting the total domination of  the other 
competitors in Interzone. 
It is within this competing ideological landscape that Agent Lee operates, a world in which no one is 
certain of  anyone’s affiliations and double agents abound. This anxious world of  interconnected 
networks of  parties seeking total control represented by “agents” who could potentially infect the 
reader constructs a paranoia in the narrative of  the text. Considering the construal of  the word as 
virus and the climate of  paranoia established by the text, the reader has little recourse except to re-
main suspicious of  agent Lee. Lee operates as the reader’s locator within the swirling milieu of  
Naked Lunch and the distrust he inspires forces an anxiety into the interpretative exchange between 
text and reader. This interpretative anxiety is pronounced amongst the competing factions (political 
parties, drug addicts and narcotics agents, industrialists and anarchists) seeking to subsume one an-
other under the various programs they are fighting for.  
The enveloping experience of  Naked Lunch is most explicitly evident in the routine called “Bradley 
the Buyer”. The routine describes the collapsing human form of  Bradley, a successful narcotics 
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agent, as he becomes addicted to contact with the “junkies” he is hired to catch. Bradley pays a 
young junkie to rub against him and help him “‘get fixed’” (15). The boy describes the process:  
“Most distasteful thing I ever stand still for,” he says. “Some way he makes himself  all soft 
like a blob of  jelly and surround me so nasty. Then he gets wet all over like with green 
slime…” (15)    
Bradley’s collapsing human form craves to envelope junkies. He is eventually destroyed by a 
flamethrower and the inquiry into his death deems his destruction a necessity because he had be-
come “a creature without species and a menace to the narcotics industry on all levels.” (17) The 
Bradley the Buyer routine collapses the apparently rigid boundary between law enforcement and 
junkie. The collapse between the two positions is manifested in the collapse of  Bradley’s form. The 
“aberration”  of  addiction, in Naked Lunch has an abhorrent persecutor in the form of  Bradley the 
Buyer (Loewisohn, 578). 
The addict and the narcotics agent are united in their dependencies on systems of  control. These 
collapsing binaries challenge the distinction between the interpreting subject and the object of  in-
terpretation, eradicating the distinct forms of  either as Bradley subsumes the junkie. Bradley the 
Buyer is such a successful narcotics agent (for a time), because “he can walk to a pusher and score 
direct. He is so anonymous, grey and spectral the pusher don’t remember him afterwards.” (14) He 
has taken on, initially through performance, the aspects which Burroughs uses to define the “junk” 
addict. Again, Lydenberg’s words ring true: “performance is never innocent in Naked Lunch; it even-
tually replaces life itself, the imitation absorbing and devouring the original.” (40) For the Gadamer-
ian reader, the text “devours” the dialogic exchange by presenting an authoritative rendering of  
control. The text approaches the dialogic exchange in such a way that the reader becomes aware of  
its manipulations during the interpretative dialogue. Like Bradley the buyer who could pass as a 
junkie, Naked Lunch passes as a text, desiring to be read and understood. However, the understanding 
available in Naked Lunch manifests itself  in the effect of  the text on the interpretative gestures of  the 
reader. As with the talking asshole routine, Bradley the buyer’s consumption of  all that surrounds 
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him becomes a constant menace in a text which combats the reader’s interpretative efforts. The text 
challenges the reader’s location as separate from the world of  Naked Lunch, dragging him/her deeper 
into the bowels of  the novel and exposing how Naked Lunch can become a coercive manipulative 
force in the interpretative dialogue. It is this enveloping quality of  the text which encourages the 
reader to remain suspicious of  Naked Lunch’s interpretative engagement. The Gadamerian desire to 
interrogate prejudgements through horizonal collision drives this interrogation and suspicion sur-
rounding the engagement with Naked Lunch. 
	 	 3.3 
As with Watt, Naked Lunch opens in a train station. But unlike the open air tram station where Hack-
ett and the Nixons observe Watt’s arrival, Naked Lunch descends into a subway rail system. The open-
ing lines of  the text, “I can feel the heat closing in” establish the paranoid air of  the novel as it drags 
the reader into the bowels of  an unnamed city (3). The unnamed and faceless “heat” is revealed to 
be a narcotics agent chasing Lee down into the subway. Lee moves quickly as he “vaults a turnstile 
and two flights down the iron stairs, catch an uptown A train” (3). The words seem to run into each 
other as the lines merge to create a parataxis connoting the blur of  Lee’s movements. To open the 
novel in this way, with a pursuit and an escape, establishes the anxious-ness of  Naked Lunch as the 
novel draws the reader into “a literal descent into the underworld” it has constructed (Loewinsohn, 
566). From the outset the text evades the reader, beginning in medias res the reader is left to piece to-
gether the reasons for Lee’s escape. 
Lee just makes it on to the A train aided by, 
a [y]oung, good looking, crew cut, Ivy League, advertising exec type fruit holds the door back 
for me. I am evidently his idea of  a character. You know the type: comes on with bar tenders and 
cab drivers, talking about right hooks and the Dodgers, calls the counterman at Nedick's by 
his first name. A real asshole. (3, my emphasis) 
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The reader is drawn into the train with Lee by the assertion that the reader “knows the type”. Lee’s 
narrative seeks to construct an ally in the reader against the purported “phoniness” of  the “square” 
who “wants to come on hip.” (4) However, in what comes to be a typical manoeuvre in Naked Lunch, 
Lee uses two slang terms that are parenthetically glossed specifically “for the reader” (Hilfer, 253). 
Lee also tells the reader that he “put it on him for a sawski” and sets up a “meet to sell him some 
‘pod’ as he calls it, thinking ‘I’ll catnip the jerk’.” (5) An editorial note reveals that to “catnip” some-
one is to promise the potential “mark” marijuana and sell them catnip, which is “[f]requently passed 
on the incautious or the uninitiated” (5). In  these opening pages the reader is presumptuously allied 
with Lee in his distaste and mistrust of  the “square” advertising exec, involved in Lee’s potential 
scam, and reminded of  the narrative’s authority in the interpretative relationship through the edito-
rial notes (Hilfer, 253). The glossing immediately creates a suspicious relationship with the text. The 
reader is not sure whether the text is trying to teach him/her something despite the fact that they 
“know the type” it appears the text assumes a level of  ignorance with the slang employed. For 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic description this is a fascinating instance where the slang of  the “hip” drug 
addict, slang that is bound up in the contextual moment of  the text, is explained by the same text 
for the “uninitiated”.  
In Gadamer’s description of  interpretative dialogue the moment of  being drawn up short usually 
involves an instance of  misunderstanding or confusion. However in the editorial intrusion the con-
fusion for the reader lies in the authoritative definition of  words designated for a counter-culture. 
This authoritative tone becomes more pronounced when a later parenthetical intrusion describes an 
interpretative strategy rather than a glossing: “(Note: This is not a figure. Anopheles Mosquitoes are 
silent.)” (39) The note attached to the description of  an Anopheles Mosquito, employed in this in-
stance to evoke images of  the jungle at night, authoritatively demarcates what can and cannot be 
interpreted. “This is not a figure” delimits the space the reader has access to and the reader begins 
to doubt his/her own interpretative enterprise. If  the mosquito is authoritatively deemed “not a fig-
ure” what else in the text has been set aside for explanation rather than interrogation? The mos-
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quito is used to convey the varied existences of  the German doctor Carl is talking to. In another 
paratactical description, the mosquito features briefly to reinforce the dense, muffled night-time jun-
gle scape glimpsed in the doctor’s eyes:  
Carl talked to the doctor outside under the narrow arcade with rain bouncing up from the 
street against his pant legs, thinking how many people he tell it to, and the stairs, porches, 
lawns, driveways, corridors and streets of  the world there in the doctor’s eyes…stuffy Ger-
man alcoves, butterfly trays to the ceiling, silent portentous smell of  uremia seeping under the 
door, suburban lawns to sound of  the water sprinkler, in calm jungle night under silent wings 
of  the Anopheles mosquito (Note[…]) (39) 
The point is that the mosquito does not do much work for the description glimpsed in the Doctor’s 
eyes. However, what the note achieves is to foster a sense of  interpretative doubt on the part of  the 
reader. The text will not allow the Anopheles mosquito to be interpreted as a figure, yet in a meta-
hermeneutic manoeuvre the parenthetical glossing becomes an effective device in the interpretative 
exchange. This note, coupled with the alliance shared with Lee in the opening pages create the 
sense of  being “conned” in Naked Lunch. The text wishes to manipulate the reader in order to show 
him/her how easily this is achieved through language.  
In the opening section, once Lee has made his way onto the A train, he encounters the “kid” who 
held the door for him: “‘Thanks kid,’ I say, ‘I can see you’re one of  our own.’” Lee’s ingratiating 
tone is directed towards the advertising executive rather than the reader in this instance, and the ex-
ecutive’s face is described as lighting up with “stupid, pink affect.” (4) The reader is told earlier that 
Lee provided the executive with “his B production” and that he knows what the executive is thinking 
about Lee,“‘What a character!! Wait till I tell the boys in Clarks about this one.’”(3 & 5. My empha-
sis.) Lee portrays an expedient awareness of  how he is perceived and this has two interpretative con-
sequences for the reader: firstly, Lee comes across as a paranoid con artist, desperately seeking a way 
to “put it on” someone whom he deems to be vulnerable. Secondly, the reader cannot know for sure 
that Lee is not trying to turn him/her into a “mark”. This is because the “B production” the “kid” is 
presumed to desire is exactly what the reader is engaged in. The same ingratiating tone employed 
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on the “kid”—“you’re one of  our own”—is employed in relation to the reader—“you know the 
type”. Both interpretative consequences effect a heightened sense of  anxiety in the interpretative 
moment. 
Naked Lunch’s manipulation of  language takes on many guises. The malapropisms, misquotes, mis-
spellings, and typographical errors disrupt habitual modes of  linear reading. Naked Lunch seems to 
present the reader with the anxiety inducing infection of  Burroughs’s “word hoard” (97) in order to 
show how the text is destroying its own language: “The word cannot be expressed direct…It can 
perhaps be indicated by mosaic of  juxtaposition like articles abandoned in a hotel drawer, defined 
by negatives and absence…” (97) Because the word cannot be directly accessed Naked Lunch presents 
a mosaic, a juxtaposition of  scenes which play against one another exposing the spaces in between. 
Oliver Harris describes this fascination with Burroughs’s “word hoard”: 
What fascinates us always calls us back for more. At the same time, this “more” remains for-
ever beyond the meanings or narratives we can produce, because it is a materiality we can 
recognise but whose content escapes narrative knowledge. (Harris, 17) 
The consequences of  seeking out this “more” described by Harris manifest themselves in the inter-
pretative experience of  Naked Lunch. The anxiety induced through a desire to understand the text, is 
accessible by acknowledging the incompleteness of  the document. The text relies on the effect it 
produces on the reader for its meaning to be conveyed. The dramatisation of  the manipulative ef-
fects of  language in the interpretative exchange between reader and text become the site in which 
Naked Lunch’s meaning is conveyed. In this sense the text is flush with meaning on two levels: it pos-
sesses it in great quantity and engenders a radical negative capability in which the reader needs to 
acquaint themselves with the delimitations of  his/her hermeneutic situation. It is this radicalised 
negative capability that delimits the scope of  hermeneutic enquiry and encourages the meta-
hermeneutic discussion surrounding meaning in Naked Lunch. Secondly, the text flushes meaning 
away from itself  and locates it in the dialogic space. It is the experience of  being “conned” by Naked 
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Lunch that enforces Burroughs’s concerns with control, authority and language. In Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic description this “more” comes to light in the dialogic exchange between reader and 
text; the collision of  prejudgements exposes the “negatives” and “absences” that work on the fringes 
of  meaning. It is exactly this space that Gadamer’s theory has been critiqued for blindly assimilating. 
However, through the anxious interpretative engagement produced in the reader as s/he reads 
Naked Lunch, these marginal areas become pronounceable in a silence which is “demanded” by the 
text. This silence responds to the critiques levelled at Gadamer’s theory, and is accessible by interro-
gating the anxious effects of  Naked Lunch on the Gadamerian reader. As such Habermas’s criticisms 
do not seem to hold up against philosophical hermeneutics. By reading Naked Lunch through 
Gadamer’s dialogical description of  interpretation, it becomes apparent that the novel’s deep mis-
trust of  language heightens the reader’s awareness to his/her position within a Traditionary struc-
ture. “It is important to note that all interpretation points in a direction rather than to some final 
endpoint, in the sense that it points toward an open realm…” (Gadamer 1961, 68) The “open 
realm” in Gadamer’s formulation finds purchase in Naked Lunch in the silence of  the reader.  
The dialogic relationship between Naked Lunch and the reader is a contested space in which both 
parties are vying for the chance to be heard. However, through this dialogue the reader becomes 
aware that the only way s/he could be heard is through an ideologically compromised language. 
The use of  language as a medium of  control reinforces the text’s position in the dialogue and as 
such, the reader is not interrogating the document but embodying the text’s concerns. Thus the so-
lution for the reader is found in silence. A critically appraising silence in which the concerns the text 
expresses are noted, reflected and his/her position in a Traditionary structure is interrogated. This 
heightened awareness responds to Habermas’s criticisms of  assimilationist hermeneutics in 
Gadamer’s system because the reader has begun to question the interpellated role of  language in 
his/her horizon. Through silence the paradoxical relationship Burroughs shares with language in 
Naked Lunch is avoided and the impasse is resolved.  
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Conclusion 
Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to highlight the tension that exists between 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and the two avante-garde, proto-postmodernist texts Watt 
and Naked Lunch. This tension is borne out of  a theoretical description of  meaning and understand-
ing as it “always occurs” in the shape of  philosophical hermeneutics, and two novels who expressly 
challenge the possibility of  understanding at all. What I have argued for is that this does not mean 
that Gadamer’s description of  meaning and understanding has nothing to offer an interpretation of  
these two notoriously difficult works. Instead, Gadamer allowed me to describe the interpretative 
experience of  an interrogative dialogue with Watt and Naked Lunch. Philosophical hermeneutics en-
couraged a discussion around the effects both texts create during the interpretative dialogue. This in 
turn allowed me to describe the meta-hermeneutic concerns of  both novels. It is this meta-
hermeneutic that I have argued is particularly fecund when engaging with these works. It is in Watt’s 
and Naked Lunch’s interpretation as meta-hermeneutic that the effects of  both novels on the reader’s 
interpretative experience can be expressed. These effects, as I have shown, are the site in which the 
meaning of  both texts manifests itself. The consequences of  this for Gadamer’s descriptive 
hermeneutics has allowed for a response to Habermas’s lasting criticism of  philosophical hermeneu-
tics. Gadamer’s description of  meaning does not blindly assimilate the prejudgements of  an uninter-
rogated Tradition, as Habermas claims. Instead, by allowing the effects of  the novels to become an 
essential component in the interpretative exchange, philosophical hermeneutics illustrates the multi-
plicity of  Traditionary forces at play during interpretative dialogue. In turn this encourages the 
reader to remain aware of  what would otherwise take place “behind [the reader’s] back” (Gadamer 
38). It is this conscious engagement with the forces of  “systematic distortion” that both novels em-
ploy in their complication of  habitual modes of  reading. 
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This complication takes on different guises and strategies in Watt and Naked Lunch. In Watt the reader 
is exiled to a spectatorial space, encouraged to engage with the text’s multiple historical horizons 
and multiple versions as the novel interprets itself. In turn this spectatorial position allows the reader 
to note the failed hermeneutic efforts of  Watt’s interlocutors and narrators. But it is not the failure 
that carries the fascination—the “more” in Oliver Harris’s description—it is in the reasons for the 
failure that the reader is drawn “up short” (Gadamer1960, 280). The failed hermeneutic of  Watt, 
brought about because of  his lack of  historicity, encourages the reader to reflect on the meanings 
and interpretations s/he finds in the text. This discussion of  why does not necessarily involve a solip-
sistic enquiry into the reader’s hermeneutical situation and the reasons for their own interpretative 
manoeuvres. What it does allow the reader to discuss is why the text would encourage such interpre-
tations. This is the effect of  the text on the reader’s hermeneutic enterprise and, as I have shown to 
be the case with Watt, this effect is the site in which the meaning of  the novel is made manifest. In 
Naked Lunch this hermeneutic effect is the site in which the meaning of  the text is dramatised. The 
reader’s dialogic engagement with the novel, in which s/he is simultaneously constructed as “gentle” 
and as a “blood brother in the same dirty needle” is indelibly influenced by the anxiety of  being 
conned and manipulated by the novel. This anxiety reinforces Burroughs’s concerns surrounding 
language as a medium of  control. For Watt the text parodies conventional interpretative strategies 
and symbol analysis. Naked Lunch lures the reader into an interpretative trap, ensnaring him/her in 
the “con” job of  the narrative, ultimately validating its critiques of  language. The effect of  these 
processes is to foster an interpretative relationship with the reader that anticipates the description of  
philosophical hermeneutics provided by Gadamer.  
By rejuvenating the concept of  prejudgement and creating a theoretical description which located 
the historically inherited prejudgements of  the reader and the text as central to the interpretative 
effort, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics blurs the distinction between “object” and “subject”. 
Prejudgements influence one another when brought into dialogic contact. This influence is the site 
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in which the historical horizons of  both parties fuses, and perpetually renews itself. In Watt and 
Naked Lunch this renewal and fusion is given expression in the texts themselves. In the myriad rou-
tines Burroughs’s places in juxtaposition, colliding and vying for control of  the narrative, the text 
dramatises the collision of  historical horizons through juxtaposition. In Watt the simulacra of  Watt 
interrogates the narrative world created by Sam and finds himself  unable to “know” anything about 
said world. Sam and a “present” Watt waltz in a divide between two separate and distinct locations, 
but Sam fails to understand Watt’s capability to influence and affect him. This bleeds into the narra-
tive and the simulacra of  Watt is interpretatively stunted because of  Sam’s failed hermeneutic ef-
forts. The horizons represented by the text influence and change experiences of  characters in the 
novel. This effect is what Gadamer calls “effective history”, in which the understanding of  the read-
er is indelibly influenced by his/her location in time as well as their interaction with a text. In Watt 
this process is dramatised by Sam’s failure to note the influence Watt has upon his construction of  
Watt’s story. 
Gadamer’s rejuvenation of  prejudgement, as I have argued, presents a unique way of  engaging with 
these fractious and compelling novels. Beckett’s and Burroughs’s novels challenge Gadamer’s con-
ception of  historical horizon by multiplying any understanding of  it. They do this by contesting any 
notion of  meaning that is whole or unified in its representation. However, they do require an inter-
pretative commitment manifest in the dialogic relationship with the reader. The monolith of  Tradi-
tion that Gadamer is guilty of  describing at times, is fractured and shown to be multiple. This is true 
of  the text’s multiple meanings as well. The challenge to unified, coherent meaning that both texts 
issue, as I have shown to be the case, is the claim made on the reader. This claim encourages a meta-
hermeneutic engagement with both Watt and Naked Lunch.  
The multiplicity of  Traditionary forces illustrated by the texts’s engagement with fractious, and of-
ten fictional, horizons, illustrates the systematic distortions that Habermas was concerned were over-
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looked by philosophical hermeneutics. However, in both novels the reader is able to note the effect 
these text’s have during the interpretative dialogue, effects which dramatise the distortions of  inter-
pellated language and embedded ideology. As such Habermas’s concerns surrounding systematic 
distortion are given voice through the manipulation and parodic treatment of  interpretative strate-
gies in the novels. These dramatisations are available in the hermeneutic dialogue through the meta-
hermeneutic interpretation that both novels encourage. The meta-hermeneutic focus of  both novels 
finds expression in the challenges issued to Gadamer’s conception of  meaning as whole, unified and 
coherent. By challenging Gadamer’s notion of  unified coherency the novels become critical inter-
locutors with philosophical hermeneutics and, represent responses to Habermas’s ideology critique. 
It is through Gadamer’s descriptive framework that key interpretative challenges are issued by the 
texts. As I have shown, this framework is indelibly influenced by an engagement with Watt and Naked 
Lunch. By dramatising the embedded ideologies residing in language, both novels show that 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics does not blindly assimilate these historical horizons. Instead, 
philosophical hermeneutics allows the interpreter to engage with the effect these dramatisations of  
Traditionary prejudgements have upon the interpretative dialogue with the text. The effect this has 
on philosophical hermeneutics is to suggest that (at least with the two novels in question) the dialogic 
relationship between text and reader is more highly contested, and antagonistic than Gadamer de-
scribes. 
Philosophical hermeneutics makes these tensions explicit and, in the case of  Naked Lunch, encourages 
a resolution to the potential impasse of  self-destructive language in the critical silence the text leaves 
in its wake. Thus philosophical hermeneutics has come to indelibly affect the texts under discussion, 
but it has also been influenced by the texts it has been “applied to”. This affirms philosophical 
hermeneutics because it does not act as a rubric for interpretative endeavour. Instead philosophical 
hermeneutics, as I have shown, is malleable, capable of  both influencing and being influenced by 
interpretative engagement. The pre-emption of  many of  Gadamer’s concerns surrounding interpre-
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tative praxis shown to be present in both Watt and Naked Lunch speaks to this malleability. It also re-
lates to the belated nature of  theoretical descriptions. Yet even this belated-ness speaks to the anti-
teleological elements of  philosophical hermeneutics. The pre-emptive dramatisations presented in 
Watt and Naked Lunch seemingly reinforce Gadamer’s claims that understanding is always in process. 
This also lends credence to his potentially rhetorical claim that philosophical hermeneutics is a de-
scriptive theory of  understanding, because much of  what the theory describes finds allegiance in the 
representation, and complication of  meaning in both of  these preceding novels.  The influence the 
texts exert on philosophical hermeneutics is  a central tenet of  Gadamer’s descriptive theory and by 
allowing Watt and Naked Lunch to bleed into the hermeneutic framework, I have shown how Haber-
mas’s criticism is not as damning as it may have first appeared. In fact his criticism becomes a cru-
cial part of  understanding the dramatisation of  Tradition in language represented by both novels. 
These novels are flush with meaning. Firstly they are both hermeneutic novels interested in the ways 
a reader will engage with them. They both try to complicate the interpretative relationship between 
the reader and the text and as such, remain aware of  being read. This opens up a new space for the 
reader to interact with these novels. A space created by the claims made by the text on the reader. 
While both novels have conventionally been thought to be exercises in failurist hermeneutics, I have 
shown that it is this exact failure which proposes a response to Habermas’s criticism of  philosophical 
hermeneutics’s treatment of  ideology. By incorporating systematic distortion into the interpretative 
dialogue, the novels encourage an awareness of  Traditionary forces at play in language. Secondly, 
both novels anticipate aspects of  Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and as such are flush with 
philosophical musings on meaning itself. The fact that both novels effect and influence philosophical 
hermeneutics as a guiding theoretical mode, consolidates the sense of  flush I am trying to tease out 
here: in both texts meaning is so abundant that it has spilled beyond the fictional and begun to en-
gage with the theoretical. 
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